linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] X.509: Don't check the signature on apparently self-signed keys [ver #2]

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Date:	Wed, 06 Jan 2016 07:22:59 -0500
From:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc:	dwmw2@...radead.org, David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@...el.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
	Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] X.509: Don't check the signature on apparently
 self-signed keys [ver #2]

On Tue, 2016-01-05 at 16:39 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > You're missing Petko's patch:
> > 41c89b6 IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> 
> Hmmm...  This is wrong.  x509_key_preparse() shouldn't be polling the IMA MOK
> keyring under all circumstances.

The x509_validate_trust() was originally added for IMA to ensure, on a
secure boot system, a certificate chain of trust rooted in hardware.
The IMA MOK keyring extends this certificate chain of trust to the
running system.

The IMA MOK keyring is a build configuration option that defaults to
off.

Mimi

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