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Message-ID: <1452132813.3969.8.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 06 Jan 2016 21:13:33 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: petkan@...-labs.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against
IMA MOK keyring
On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> >
> > Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
> > Date: Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> >
> > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > system trusted keyring.
> >
> > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
Hm, I'm not able to add a key to the system keyring that is signed by a
key on either the system or the IMA MOK keyrings. The system keyring
seems to be "locked". A key that is signed by either a key on the
system or the IMA MOK keyring can be added to the IMA keyring.
keyctl show %keyring:.system_keyring
Keyring
973688077 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .system_keyring
evmctl import m1-cert-signed.der 973688077
add_key failed
errno: Permission denied (13)
Mimi
> > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > quite the right solution.
> Please apply this to security/next.
>
> Thanks,
> David
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