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Message-ID: <568EE5D3.1080006@sr71.net>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 14:25:23 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 31/31] x86, pkeys: execute-only support
On 01/07/2016 01:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this
>> > facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it
>> > eventually.
> And the magic benefit here is that linker/loaders can switch to just
> PROT_EXEC without PROT_READ, and everything that doesn't support this
> protection will silently include PROT_READ, so no runtime detection by
> the loader is needed.
Yep, completely agree.
I'll update the description.
>> > The security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The
> Perhaps specifically mention what it does provide, which would be
> protection against leaking executable memory contents, as generally
> done by attackers who are attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly.
Good point.
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