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Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 14:25:23 -0800 From: Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> Subject: Re: [PATCH 31/31] x86, pkeys: execute-only support On 01/07/2016 01:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> > I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this >> > facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it >> > eventually. > And the magic benefit here is that linker/loaders can switch to just > PROT_EXEC without PROT_READ, and everything that doesn't support this > protection will silently include PROT_READ, so no runtime detection by > the loader is needed. Yep, completely agree. I'll update the description. >> > The security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The > Perhaps specifically mention what it does provide, which would be > protection against leaking executable memory contents, as generally > done by attackers who are attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly. Good point.
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