linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1601102135470.6161@namei.org>
Date:	Sun, 10 Jan 2016 21:36:06 +1100 (AEDT)
From:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, petkan@...-labs.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against
 IMA MOK keyring

On Thu, 7 Jan 2016, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > > 
> > > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
> > > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > > 
> > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > > system trusted keyring.
> > > 
> > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> > > 
> > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > > quite the right solution.
> > 
> > Please apply this to security/next.
> 
> The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does
> not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.
> 
> For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled,
> get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior.  For
> systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA
> keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK
> keyring.
> 

Is this a NAK on the patch?


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>