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Message-ID: <2033.1452447990@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 17:46:30 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, petkan@...-labs.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > Is this a NAK on the patch?
>
> Yes
I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:
(1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
says. Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:
To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
key which CA is in .system keyring.
is *not* true. A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key
into the .ima_mok keyring. Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
should be merged into the .system keyring.
(2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
if the key being linked grants permission. Add a new key to one open
keyring and you can then link it across to another.
Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
patches.
(3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
'trust' is boolean in this implementation.
Again, I want to change this as per my recently posted patches.
David
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