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Message-ID: <1452711399.2683.43.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 13:56:39 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Petko Manolov <petkan@...-labs.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mdb@...iper.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against
IMA MOK keyring
On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 20:35 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote:
> > Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > I beg to differ. The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> > > being upstreamed. The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA.
> >
> > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it
> > reverting or removing. It affects module signing too.
>
> The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured
> x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted. This
> could easily be fixed.
When IMA_MOK_KEYRING is not enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() will return
NULL. x509_validate_trust() will return -EOPNOTSUPP.
The code is fine.
Mimi
> Some users do want to be able to load kernel modules signed by other trusted
> parties. Think of .ima_mok as system wide keyring in this case. It is
> semantically broken, but it does the right thing.
>
>
> Petko
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