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Message-ID: <CALYGNiNN+QYpd-FhM+4WXd=-1UYrhR7kpefbN8mpjh4gSbDO4A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 08:55:01 +0300
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
yalin wang <yalin.wang2010@...il.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing
On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 12:22 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
> those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member
> of the group. This is enforced when using write and truncate but not
> when writing to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file
> writer to gain privileges by changing a binary without losing the
> setuid/setgid/caps bits.
>
> Changing the bits requires holding inode->i_mutex, so it cannot be done
> during the page fault (due to mmap_sem being held during the fault).
> Instead, clear the bits if PROT_WRITE is being used at mmap open time,
> or added at mprotect tLooks good to me.ime.
>
> Since we can't do the check in the right place inside mmap (due to
> holding mmap_sem), we have to do it before holding mmap_sem, which
> means duplicating some checks, which have to be available to the non-MMU
> builds too.
>
> When walking VMAs during mprotect, we need to drop mmap_sem (while
> holding a file reference) and restart the walk after clearing privileges.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Looks good. Ack.
> ---
> v9:
> - use file_needs_remove_privs, jack & koct9i
> v8:
> - use mmap/mprotect method, with mprotect walk restart, thanks to koct9i
> v7:
> - document and avoid arch-specific O_* values, viro
> v6:
> - clarify ETXTBSY situation in comments, luto
> v5:
> - add to f_flags instead, viro
> - add i_mutex during __fput, jack
> v4:
> - delay removal instead of still needing mmap_sem for mprotect, yalin
> v3:
> - move outside of mmap_sem for real now, fengguang
> - check return code of file_remove_privs, akpm
> v2:
> - move to mmap from fault handler, jack
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
> mm/mmap.c | 20 ++++----------------
> mm/mprotect.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/util.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 00bad7793788..b264c8be7114 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -1912,6 +1912,7 @@ extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned lo
>
> extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long len, vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff);
> +extern int do_mmap_shared_checks(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
> extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
> vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate);
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index 2ce04a649f6b..b3424db0a29e 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1320,25 +1320,13 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> return -EAGAIN;
>
> if (file) {
> - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + int err;
>
> switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
> case MAP_SHARED:
> - if ((prot&PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE))
> - return -EACCES;
> -
> - /*
> - * Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
> - * file..
> - */
> - if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
> - return -EACCES;
> -
> - /*
> - * Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
> - */
> - if (locks_verify_locked(file))
> - return -EAGAIN;
> + err = do_mmap_shared_checks(file, prot);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
>
> vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
> if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index ef5be8eaab00..57cb81c11668 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> #include <linux/shm.h>
> #include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/highmem.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> @@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
>
> vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot);
>
> +restart:
> down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
>
> vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
> @@ -416,6 +418,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * If we're adding write permissions to a shared file,
> + * we must clear privileges (like done at mmap time),
> + * but we have to juggle the locks to avoid holding
> + * mmap_sem while holding i_mutex.
> + */
> + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && vma->vm_file &&
> + (newflags & VM_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) &&
> + file_needs_remove_privs(vma->vm_file)) {
> + struct file *file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> +
> + start = vma->vm_start;
> + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
> + mutex_lock(&file_inode(file)->i_mutex);
> + error = file_remove_privs(file);
> + mutex_unlock(&file_inode(file)->i_mutex);
> + fput(file);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> + goto restart;
> + }
> +
> error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
> if (error)
> goto out;
> diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
> index 9af1c12b310c..1882eaf33a37 100644
> --- a/mm/util.c
> +++ b/mm/util.c
> @@ -283,6 +283,29 @@ int __weak get_user_pages_fast(unsigned long start,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_user_pages_fast);
>
> +int do_mmap_shared_checks(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> +
> + if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /*
> + * Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
> + * file..
> + */
> + if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
> + return -EACCES;
> +
> + /*
> + * Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
> + */
> + if (locks_verify_locked(file))
> + return -EAGAIN;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
> unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff)
> @@ -291,6 +314,33 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> unsigned long populate;
>
> + /*
> + * If we must remove privs, we do it here since doing it during
> + * page fault may be expensive and cannot hold inode->i_mutex,
> + * since mm->mmap_sem is already held.
> + */
> + if (file && (flag & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) {
> + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!IS_NOSEC(inode)) {
> + /*
> + * Make sure we can't strip privs from a file that
> + * wouldn't otherwise be allowed to be mmapped.
> + */
> + err = do_mmap_shared_checks(file, prot);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
> + err = file_remove_privs(file);
> + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
> +
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + }
> + }
> +
> ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flag);
> if (!ret) {
> down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> --
> 2.6.3
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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