Message-ID: <20160119113203.23238.71230.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 19 Jan 2016 11:32:03 +0000
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	keyrings@...r.kernel.org, petkan@...-labs.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 13/20] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its
 own file [ver #2]

Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be
generalised.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
---

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile           |    2 
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c |  195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      |    6 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |  170 -------------------------
 4 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index cd1406f9b14a..3f291bbf7b74 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o
 
 asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o public_key_trust.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
 
 #
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9febe612e659
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@...hat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+#include "public_key.h"
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
+			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
+		use_builtin_keys = true;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
+ * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
+ * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier.  The preferred identifier is
+ * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
+ * subjectKeyIdentifier.  If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
+ * the latter must also match.
+ */
+struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+					const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+					const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
+					bool partial)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t ref;
+	const char *lookup;
+	char *req, *p;
+	int len;
+
+	if (id) {
+		lookup = id->data;
+		len = id->len;
+	} else {
+		lookup = skid->data;
+		len = skid->len;
+	}
+
+	/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
+	p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (partial) {
+		*p++ = 'i';
+		*p++ = 'd';
+	} else {
+		*p++ = 'e';
+		*p++ = 'x';
+	}
+	*p++ = ':';
+	p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
+	*p = 0;
+
+	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
+
+	ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+			     &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+	if (IS_ERR(ref))
+		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+	kfree(req);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+		switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
+			/* Hide some search errors */
+		case -EACCES:
+		case -ENOTDIR:
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		default:
+			return ERR_CAST(ref);
+		}
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+	if (id && skid) {
+		const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+		if (!kids->id[1]) {
+			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
+			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
+			goto reject;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+	return key;
+
+reject:
+	key_put(key);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
+
+/*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+			struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+	struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
+	struct key *key;
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!trust_keyring)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (cert->unsupported_sig)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+					  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
+					  false);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	if (!use_builtin_keys ||
+	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) {
+		ret = public_key_verify_signature(
+			key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig);
+		if (ret == -ENOPKG)
+			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+	}
+	key_put(key);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index e373e7483812..0cf670b196c8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -59,3 +59,9 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t,  size_t hdrlen,
  */
 extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
 extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+
+/*
+ * public_key_trust.c
+ */
+extern int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+			       struct key *trust_keyring);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 00aef0d121b2..7397edb6cefb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -24,133 +24,6 @@
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
-static bool use_builtin_keys;
-static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-static struct {
-	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
-	unsigned char data[10];
-} cakey;
-
-static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
-{
-	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
-		return 1;
-
-	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
-		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
-		int ret;
-
-		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
-			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
-			return 1;
-		}
-
-		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
-		else
-			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
-	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
-		use_builtin_keys = true;
-	}
-
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
-#endif
-
-/**
- * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
- * @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
- * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
- * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
- *
- * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier.  The preferred identifier is
- * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
- * subjectKeyIdentifier.  If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
- * the latter must also match.
- */
-struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
-					const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
-					const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
-					bool partial)
-{
-	struct key *key;
-	key_ref_t ref;
-	const char *lookup;
-	char *req, *p;
-	int len;
-
-	if (id) {
-		lookup = id->data;
-		len = id->len;
-	} else {
-		lookup = skid->data;
-		len = skid->len;
-	}
-
-	/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
-	p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!req)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
-	if (partial) {
-		*p++ = 'i';
-		*p++ = 'd';
-	} else {
-		*p++ = 'e';
-		*p++ = 'x';
-	}
-	*p++ = ':';
-	p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
-	*p = 0;
-
-	pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
-
-	ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-			     &key_type_asymmetric, req);
-	if (IS_ERR(ref))
-		pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
-	kfree(req);
-
-	if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
-		switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
-			/* Hide some search errors */
-		case -EACCES:
-		case -ENOTDIR:
-		case -EAGAIN:
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-		default:
-			return ERR_CAST(ref);
-		}
-	}
-
-	key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
-	if (id && skid) {
-		const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
-		if (!kids->id[1]) {
-			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
-			goto reject;
-		}
-		if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
-			pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
-			goto reject;
-		}
-	}
-
-	pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
-	return key;
-
-reject:
-	key_put(key);
-	return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
-
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -294,49 +167,6 @@ not_self_signed:
 }
 
 /*
- * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
- * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
- * new certificate as being trusted.
- *
- * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
- * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
- * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
- */
-static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
-			       struct key *trust_keyring)
-{
-	struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
-	struct key *key;
-	int ret = 1;
-
-	if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
-		return 1;
-
-	if (!trust_keyring)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
-		return -EPERM;
-	if (cert->unsupported_sig)
-		return -ENOPKG;
-
-	key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-					  sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
-					  false);
-	if (IS_ERR(key))
-		return PTR_ERR(key);
-
-	if (!use_builtin_keys ||
-	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) {
-		ret = public_key_verify_signature(
-			key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig);
-		if (ret == -ENOPKG)
-			cert->unsupported_sig = true;
-	}
-	key_put(key);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
  */
 static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)

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