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Message-Id: <20160120215514.224518169@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 14:01:16 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Petr Matousek <pmatouse@...hat.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 44/47] KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by name
3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
commit 94c4554ba07adbdde396748ee7ae01e86cf2d8d7 upstream.
There appears to be a race between:
(1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list
(2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
(ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).
Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key->security.
Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
security/keys/gc.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
+ /* Throw away the key data */
+ if (key->type->destroy)
+ key->type->destroy(key);
+
security_key_free(key);
/* deal with the user's key tracking and quota */
@@ -157,10 +161,6 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
- /* now throw away the key memory */
- if (key->type->destroy)
- key->type->destroy(key);
-
key_user_put(key->user);
kfree(key->description);
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