linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.3 010/157] KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB

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Message-Id: <20160127180933.058817508@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Wed, 27 Jan 2016 10:11:17 -0800
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.3 010/157] KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB

4.3-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

commit cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d upstream.

This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).

VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.

Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |   14 +++-----------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1108,6 +1108,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *s
 	set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
 	set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
 	set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
+	set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
 
 	set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
 	set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
@@ -1642,20 +1643,13 @@ static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_v
 	mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
 }
 
-static void update_db_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void update_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 
-	clr_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
 	clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
 
-	if (svm->nmi_singlestep)
-		set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
-
 	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
-		if (vcpu->guest_debug &
-		    (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
-			set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
 		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
 			set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
 	} else
@@ -1761,7 +1755,6 @@ static int db_interception(struct vcpu_s
 		if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP))
 			svm->vmcb->save.rflags &=
 				~(X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
-		update_db_bp_intercept(&svm->vcpu);
 	}
 
 	if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug &
@@ -3761,7 +3754,6 @@ static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm
 	 */
 	svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
 	svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
-	update_db_bp_intercept(vcpu);
 }
 
 static int svm_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
@@ -4383,7 +4375,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops =
 	.vcpu_load = svm_vcpu_load,
 	.vcpu_put = svm_vcpu_put,
 
-	.update_db_bp_intercept = update_db_bp_intercept,
+	.update_db_bp_intercept = update_bp_intercept,
 	.get_msr = svm_get_msr,
 	.set_msr = svm_set_msr,
 	.get_segment_base = svm_get_segment_base,