[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20160127180912.456581692@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 10:12:38 -0800
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 44/67] net: preserve IP control block during GSO segmentation
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>
[ Upstream commit 9207f9d45b0ad071baa128e846d7e7ed85016df3 ]
Skb_gso_segment() uses skb control block during segmentation.
This patch adds 32-bytes room for previous control block which
will be copied into all resulting segments.
This patch fixes kernel crash during fragmenting forwarded packets.
Fragmentation requires valid IP CB in skb for clearing ip options.
Also patch removes custom save/restore in ovs code, now it's redundant.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALYGNiP-0MZ-FExV2HutTvE9U-QQtkKSoE--KN=JQE5STYsjAA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/skbuff.h | 3 ++-
net/core/dev.c | 5 +++++
net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 1 +
net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 5 +----
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 2 ++
5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -3446,7 +3446,8 @@ struct skb_gso_cb {
int encap_level;
__u16 csum_start;
};
-#define SKB_GSO_CB(skb) ((struct skb_gso_cb *)(skb)->cb)
+#define SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET 32
+#define SKB_GSO_CB(skb) ((struct skb_gso_cb *)((skb)->cb + SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET))
static inline int skb_tnl_header_len(const struct sk_buff *inner_skb)
{
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -2542,6 +2542,8 @@ static inline bool skb_needs_check(struc
*
* It may return NULL if the skb requires no segmentation. This is
* only possible when GSO is used for verifying header integrity.
+ *
+ * Segmentation preserves SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET bytes of previous skb cb.
*/
struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features, bool tx_path)
@@ -2556,6 +2558,9 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET +
+ sizeof(*SKB_GSO_CB(skb)) > sizeof(skb->cb));
+
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset = skb_headroom(skb);
SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->encap_level = 0;
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ static int ip_finish_output_gso(struct n
* from host network stack.
*/
features = netif_skb_features(skb);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IPCB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, features & ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
--- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
@@ -336,12 +336,10 @@ static int queue_gso_packets(struct data
unsigned short gso_type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
struct sw_flow_key later_key;
struct sk_buff *segs, *nskb;
- struct ovs_skb_cb ovs_cb;
int err;
- ovs_cb = *OVS_CB(skb);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*OVS_CB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
segs = __skb_gso_segment(skb, NETIF_F_SG, false);
- *OVS_CB(skb) = ovs_cb;
if (IS_ERR(segs))
return PTR_ERR(segs);
if (segs == NULL)
@@ -359,7 +357,6 @@ static int queue_gso_packets(struct data
/* Queue all of the segments. */
skb = segs;
do {
- *OVS_CB(skb) = ovs_cb;
if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP && skb != segs)
key = &later_key;
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ static int xfrm_output_gso(struct net *n
{
struct sk_buff *segs;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IPCB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0);
kfree_skb(skb);
if (IS_ERR(segs))
Powered by blists - more mailing lists