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Date:	Mon, 1 Feb 2016 02:45:16 +0300
From:	Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	Linux kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@...il.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Jason Low <jason.low2@...com>,
	Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
	Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] sigaltstack: allow disabling and re-enabling sas
 within sighandler

01.02.2016 01:44, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
> On Sun, Jan 31, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru> wrote:
>> 31.01.2016 23:11, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
>>> On Sun, Jan 31, 2016 at 12:08 PM, Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru> wrote:
>>>> 31.01.2016 22:03, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
>>>>> Also, consider a use case like yours but with *two* contexts that use
>>>>> their own altstack.  If you go to context A, enable sigaltstack, get a
>>>>> signal, temporarily disable, then swapcontext to B, which tries to
>>>>> re-enable its own sigaltstack, then everything gets confusing with
>>>>> your patch, because, with your patch, the kernel is only tracking one
>>>>> temporarily disabled sigaltstack.
>>>> Of course the good practice is to set the sigaltstack
>>>> before creating the contexts. Then the above scenario
>>>> should involve switching between 2 signal handlers to get
>>>> into troubles. I think the scenario with switching between
>>>> 2 signal handlers is very-very unrealistic.
>>> Why is it so unrealistic?  You're already using swapcontext, which
>>> means you're doing something like userspace threads (although I
>>> imagine that one of your thread-like things is DOS, but still), and,
>>> to me, that suggests that the kernel interface should be agnostic as
>>> to how many thread-like thinks are alive.
>> But you only get into troubles when you switch between 2
>> _active signal handlers_, rather than between 2 normal contexts,
>> or between 2 normal context and 1 sighandler.
>> So I am probably misunderstanding the scenario you describe.
>> Without 2 sighandlers that are active at the same time and you
>> switch between them, how would you get into troubles?
>> You say "then swapcontext to B, which tries to re-enable its own
>> sigaltstack"
>> but there can be only one sigaltstack per thread, so I am quite
>> sure by re-enabling "its own sigaltstack" it will still do the right
>> thing.
> As long as the kernel has a concept of a programmed but disabled
> sigaltstack, something is confused when there is more than one
> user-created inactive sigaltstack.
I simply don't understand how can we have more than one
sigaltstack per thread. Is this supported? If not then I don't
expect the different non-sighandler user contexts trying to
set up the different ones. So you are probably talking about
2 sighandlers switching between each other, right? And that
case is likely broken anyway.

>    So I don't see why you want the
> kernel to remember about disabled altstacks at all.
2 reasons:
- Language-lawyering around POSIX
- Consistently return oss->ss_flags when we are on a signal stack
Restoring the old sas is not among the goals, but allowing the
sighandler to freely install the new sas (as you suggest) is a clear
contradiction to POSIX. So that's why you propose SS_FORCE, yes,
but then the question: will _anyone_ use sigaltstack(SS_ONSTACK)
in a sighandler without SS_FORCE? And the answer is likely "no".
In which case your SS_FORCE erodes to "I run it from sighandler"
but this info the kernel already knows.

>> I don't think this is the problem because only the signal handler
>> should re-enable the sigaltstack, and I don't think we really should
>> switch between 2 active signal handlers. And even if we did, there
>> can be only one sigaltstack per thread, so it will re-enable always
>> the right stack (there is only one).
> Why would there only be one per thread?
If you mean every sighandler installs its own, then I think
switching between such sighandlers is broken anyway.
If you mean the non-sighandler contexts should install multiple
sigaltstacks, then I don't think this is supported or can work.

>>> ISTM it would be simpler if you did:
>>>
>>> sigaltstack(disable, force)
>>> swapcontext() to context using sigaltstack
>>> sigaltstack(set new altstack)
>>>
>>> and then later
>>>
>>> sigaltstack(disable, force)  /* just in case.  save old state, too. */
>>> swapcontext() to context not using sigaltstack
>>> sigaltstack(set new altstack)
>> In the real world you don't even need sigaltstack(set new altstack)
>> because uc_stack does this for you on rt_sigreturn. It is only my
>> test-case that does so.
> That's only the case if swapcontext is implemented using rt_sigreturn.  Is it?
No, its when you use SA_SIGINFO with sigaction().
Then the sigaltstack will magically restore itself once you
leave the sighandler. That's why I wouldn't suggest to ever
modify the sas inside the sighandler the way you propose:
it will simply not work, uc_stack will set it back. My re-enable
trick is at least in agreement with uc_stack.

>>> If it would be POSIX compliant to allow SS_DISABLE to work even if on
>>> the altstack even without a new flag (which is what you're
>>> suggesting), then getting rid of the temporary in-kernel state would
>>> considerably simplify this patch series.  Just skip the -EPERM check
>>> in the disable path.
>> Yes, that's why I was suggesting to just remove the EPERM
>> check initially. We can still do exactly that. The only problem I
>> can see with removing EPERM is that it would be hard to emulate
>> the old behaviour if need be. For example if glibc want to return
>> EPERM behaviour, it will have problems doing so because oss->ss_flags
>> doesn't say if we are on a sigaltstack and there is no other way
>> to find out.
> ...which is why I suggested SS_FORCE in the first place.
I understand. With SS_FORCE there is no temptation to emulate
the old behaviour, so there may be a fewer need to look into
oss->sa_flags even when you return it an inconsistent ways.

We probably should make a summary of our findings or they
will be forgotten.
So far I was pointing to a couple of minor problems with SS_FORCE:
- bypasses overflow protection
- prevents from asking the kernel if we are on sigaltstack or not
... and a few that I consider more important:
- does not bring any value other than to say "I am calling from sighandler"
- allows the programmer to freely modify sas while later it will
still be reset with uc_stack
(and I've likely forgot some already)

There are the upsides compared to just removing EPERM:
- fewer need to look into oss->sa_flags, so its inconsistency
became forgivable
(have I missed something else? please fill in)

There are the upsides compared to remembering the ss_flags:
- simpler code
- slightly better semantic wrt kernel threads (with my approach
restoring the context on a different kernel thread, will require
setting a separate sas there instead of restoring... but I am not
sure this is a considerably bad semantic because whoever messes
with kernel threads this way, should know how to propoerly
set sigaltstacks)

So from that summary I can agree that SS_FORCE may from
some POV be better than simply removing EPERM, as they both
share the downsides, with SS_FORCE providing minor advantages.
But I still don't see it beating my new approach.

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