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Message-ID: <56AF8E89.5090400@list.ru>
Date:	Mon, 1 Feb 2016 19:57:45 +0300
From:	Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
To:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:	Linux kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@...il.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Jason Low <jason.low2@...com>,
	Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
	Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] sigaltstack: allow disabling and re-enabling sas
 within sighandler

01.02.2016 19:06, Oleg Nesterov пишет:
> Honestly, I am not sure I understand what this patch does and why, and it is
> white space damaged, please fix.
Arrr.

> On 01/31, Stas Sergeev wrote:
>> linux implements the sigaltstack() in a way that makes it impossible to
>> use with swapcontext(). Per the man page, sigaltstack is allowed to return
>> EPERM if the process is altering its sigaltstack while running on
>> sigaltstack.
>> This is likely needed to consistently return oss->ss_flags, that indicates
>> whether the process is being on sigaltstack or not.
>> Unfortunately, linux takes that permission to return EPERM too literally:
>> it returns EPERM even if you don't want to change to another sigaltstack,
>> but only want to temporarily disable sigaltstack with SS_DISABLE.
>> You can't use swapcontext() without disabling sigaltstack first, or the
>> stack will be re-used and overwritten by a subsequent signal.
> So iiuc you want to switch the stack from the signal handler running on the
> alt stack, and you need to ensure that another SA_ONSTACK signal won't corrupt
> the alt stack in between, right?
Yes.

> Perhaps you can update the changelog to explain why do we want this change.
Beyond the fact that swapcontext() is then usable for switching
in/out of sigaltstack? But this is already mentioned and I have no
other reason for getting this in.

>> @@ -2550,8 +2551,11 @@ static inline int sas_ss_flags(unsigned long sp)
>>   {
>>       if (!current->sas_ss_size)
>>           return SS_DISABLE;
>> -
>> -    return on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0;
>> +    if (on_sig_stack(sp))
>> +        return SS_ONSTACK;
>> +    if (current->sas_ss_flags == SS_DISABLE)
>> +        return SS_DISABLE;
>> +    return 0;
> So this always return SS_ONSTACK if on_sig_stack(), see below.
>
>> +        onsigstack = on_sig_stack(sp);
>> +        if (ss_size == 0) {
>> +            switch (ss_flags) {
>> +            case 0:
>> +                error = -EPERM;
>> +                if (onsigstack)
>> +                    goto out;
>> +                current->sas_ss_sp = 0;
>> +                current->sas_ss_size = 0;
>> +                current->sas_ss_flags = SS_DISABLE;
>> +                break;
>> +            case SS_ONSTACK:
>> +                /* re-enable previously disabled sas */
>> +                error = -EINVAL;
>> +                if (current->sas_ss_size == 0)
>> +                    goto out;
>> +                break;
>> +            default:
>> +                break;
>> +            }
> and iiuc the "default" case allows you to write SS_DISABLE into ->sas_ss_flags
> even if on_sig_stack().
>
> So the sequence is
>
> 	// running on alt stack
>
> 	sigaltstack(SS_DISABLE);
>
> 	temporary_run_on_another_stack();
>
> 	sigaltstack(SS_ONSTACK);
>
> and SS_DISABLE saves us from another SA_ONSTACK signal, right?
Yes.
Note: there is a test-case in that patch serie from which
you can see or copy/paste the sample code.

> But afaics it can only help after we change the stack. Suppose that SA_ONSTACK signal
> comess before temporary_run_on_another_stack(). get_sigframe() should be fine after
> your changes (afaics), it won't pick the alt stack after SS_DISABLE.
>
> However, unless I missed something save_altstack_ex() will record SS_ONSTACK in
> uc_stack->ss_flags, and after return from signal handler restore_altstack() will
> enable alt stack again?
I don't think so. Please see the following hunk:

diff --git a/include/linux/signal.h b/include/linux/signal.h
index 92557bb..844b113 100644
--- a/include/linux/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/signal.h
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int __save_altstack(stack_t __user *, unsigned long);
      stack_t __user *__uss = uss; \
      struct task_struct *t = current; \
      put_user_ex((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &__uss->ss_sp); \
-    put_user_ex(sas_ss_flags(sp), &__uss->ss_flags); \
+    put_user_ex(t->sas_ss_flags, &__uss->ss_flags); \
      put_user_ex(t->sas_ss_size, &__uss->ss_size); \
  } while (0);

It pretends as if it changes __save_altstack(), but the reality
is that it actually changes save_altstack_ex(). This is some bug
in git perhaps (or it can't parse macros), I didn't apply any manual
editing to the patch.
The hunk that really modifies __save_altstack() also exists btw:

@@ -3168,7 +3186,7 @@ int __save_altstack(stack_t __user *uss, unsigned 
long sp)
  {
      struct task_struct *t = current;
      return  __put_user((void __user *)t->sas_ss_sp, &uss->ss_sp) |
-        __put_user(sas_ss_flags(sp), &uss->ss_flags) |
+        __put_user(t->sas_ss_flags, &uss->ss_flags) |
          __put_user(t->sas_ss_size, &uss->ss_size);
  }

So I understand this is very confusing, but I think the patch
is correct.

Do you think adding the SS_FORCE flag would be a better solution?

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