linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/4] sigaltstack: allow disabling and re-enabling sas within sighandler

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Tue, 2 Feb 2016 02:06:43 +0300
From:	Stas Sergeev <stsp@...t.ru>
To:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:	Linux kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@...il.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Jason Low <jason.low2@...com>,
	Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@....de>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
	Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] sigaltstack: allow disabling and re-enabling sas
 within sighandler

01.02.2016 23:41, Oleg Nesterov пишет:
> On 02/01, Stas Sergeev wrote:
>> 01.02.2016 22:29, Oleg Nesterov пишет:
>>>>> 	sigaltstack({ DISABLE | FORCE}, &old_ss);
>>>>> 	swapcontext();
>>>>> 	sigaltstack(&old_ss, NULL);
>>>>> 	rt_sigreturn();
>>>>>
>>>>> and if you are going to return from sighandler you do not even need the 2nd
>>>>> sigaltstack(), you can rely on sigreturn.
>>>> Yes, that's what I do in my app already.
>>>> But its only there when SA_SIGINFO is used.
>>> Hmm. how this connects to SA_SIGINFO ?
>> AFAIK without SA_SIGINFO you get sigreturn instead of
>> rt_sigreturn, which doesn't seem to do restore_altstack().
>> Or am I wrong?
>>
>> Hmm:
>>
>>          /* Set up the stack frame */
>>          if (is_ia32_frame()) {
>>                  if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
>>                          return ia32_setup_rt_frame(usig, ksig, cset, regs);
>>                  else
>>                          return ia32_setup_frame(usig, ksig, cset, regs);
> Ah, ia32... So this is even more confusing.
>
>>>>>> What's at the end? Do we want a surprise for the user
>>>>>> that he's new_sas got ignored?
>>>>> Can't understand.... do you mean "set up new_sas" will be ignored because
>>>>> rt_sigreturn() does restore_sigaltstack() ? I see no problem here...
>>>> Allowing the modifications that were previously EPERMed
>>>> but will now be silently ignored, may be seen as a problem.
>>>> But if it isn't - fine, lets code that.
>>> Still can't understand. The 2nd sigaltstack() is no longer EPERMed because
>>> application used SS_FORCED before that and disabled altstack.
>>>
>>> And it is not ignored, it actually changes alt stack. Until we return from
>>> handler.
>> Before we return, the signals are usually blocked.
>> So whatever is after return is most important.
> Yes, but I still can't understand your "silently ignored". At least how does
> this differ from the case when a non-SA_ONSTACK signal handler does
> sigaltstack() and then rt_sigreturn() restores the old stack.
There is quite a difference.
It is very-very unlikely that non-SA_ONSTACK signal handler does 
sigaltstack().
I think only the test-case could exhibit this.
But with SS_FORCE - most of every SS_FORCE user will be
trapped, because, as you mentioned, not many know about
uc_stack. My patch was allowing them to do only what is safe:
just as it was without a patch.
But anyway, I'll be implementing SS_FORCE because 2 people
have voted.