linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 058/180] NFSv4: Don't perform cached access checks before we've OPENed the file

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Message-Id: <1454538786-12215-59-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Date:	Wed,  3 Feb 2016 22:31:04 +0000
From:	Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc:	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>,
	Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 058/180] NFSv4: Don't perform cached access checks before we've OPENed the file

3.16.7-ckt24 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

---8<------------------------------------------------------------

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>

commit 762674f86d0328d5dc923c966e209e1ee59663f2 upstream.

Donald Buczek reports that a nfs4 client incorrectly denies
execute access based on outdated file mode (missing 'x' bit).
After the mode on the server is 'fixed' (chmod +x) further execution
attempts continue to fail, because the nfs ACCESS call updates
the access parameter but not the mode parameter or the mode in
the inode.

The root cause is ultimately that the VFS is calling may_open()
before the NFS client has a chance to OPEN the file and hence revalidate
the access and attribute caches.

Al Viro suggests:
>>> Make nfs_permission() relax the checks when it sees MAY_OPEN, if you know
>>> that things will be caught by server anyway?
>>
>> That can work as long as we're guaranteed that everything that calls
>> inode_permission() with MAY_OPEN on a regular file will also follow up
>> with a vfs_open() or dentry_open() on success. Is this always the
>> case?
>
> 1) in do_tmpfile(), followed by do_dentry_open() (not reachable by NFS since
> it doesn't have ->tmpfile() instance anyway)
>
> 2) in atomic_open(), after the call of ->atomic_open() has succeeded.
>
> 3) in do_last(), followed on success by vfs_open()
>
> That's all.  All calls of inode_permission() that get MAY_OPEN come from
> may_open(), and there's no other callers of that puppy.

Reported-by: Donald Buczek <buczek@...gen.mpg.de>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109771
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1451046656-26319-1-git-send-email-buczek@molgen.mpg.de
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...marydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
---
 fs/nfs/dir.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c
index 4a3d4ef76127..82253864acf7 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -2336,6 +2336,9 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		case S_IFLNK:
 			goto out;
 		case S_IFREG:
+			if ((mask & MAY_OPEN) &&
+			   nfs_server_capable(inode, NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN))
+				return 0;
 			break;
 		case S_IFDIR:
 			/*