linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86: Honour passed pgprot in track_pfn_insert() and track_pfn

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALCETrUaoT2ZnQtTgecQL_bsgHNRezcg_oaPnJyajT+WOx_4EQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 9 Feb 2016 19:06:12 -0800
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc:	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...ux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <matthew.r.wilcox@...el.com>,
	"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86: Honour passed pgprot in track_pfn_insert() and track_pfn_remap()

On Feb 9, 2016 6:24 AM, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
>
> * Matthew Wilcox <willy@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> > > I sure hope not.  If vm_page_prot was writable, something was already broken,
> > > because this is the vvar mapping, and the vvar mapping is VM_READ (and not
> > > even VM_MAYREAD).
> >
> > I do beg yor pardon.  I thought you were inserting a readonly page into the
> > middle of a writable mapping.  Instead you're inserting a non-executable page
> > into the middle of a VM_READ | VM_EXEC mapping. Sorry for the confusion.  I
> > should have written:
> >
> > "like your patch ends up mapping the HPET into userspace executable"
> >
> > which is far less exciting.
>
> Btw., a side note, an executable HPET page has its own dangers as well, for
> example because it always changes in value, it can probabilistically represent
> 'sensible' (and dangerous) executable x86 instructions that exploits can return
> to.
>
> So only mapping it readable (which Andy's patch attempts I think) is worthwile.

The whole vma is readable but not executable, so I don't think this
was a problem.  It's also at a randomized address, which helps.

--Andy