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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1602121807090.21269@namei.org>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 18:11:54 +1100 (AEDT)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT] EVM hmac security fix
Please pull this patch for the EVM code, which fixes CVE-2016-2085.
The following changes since commit c05235d50f681bf685e7290cae05ab3b4fa493f3:
Merge tag 'gpio-v4.5-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linusw/linux-gpio (2016-02-11 11:25:55 -0800)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git for-linus
Ryan Ware (1):
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
---
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1
Author: Ryan Ware <ware@...ux.intel.com>
Date: Thu Feb 11 15:58:44 2016 -0800
EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index f716025..e6ea9d4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "evm.h"
int evm_initialized;
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
if (rc)
break;
- rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
+ rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
sizeof(calc.digest));
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
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