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Date:	Tue, 16 Feb 2016 17:56:05 +0100
From:	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:	Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc:	Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@....com>,
	joro@...tes.org, alex.williamson@...hat.com, gleb@...nel.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, wei@...hat.com,
	sherry.hurwitz@....com
Subject: Re: [PART1 RFC 5/9] svm: Add VMEXIT handlers for AVIC



On 16/02/2016 15:13, Radim Krčmář wrote:
> Yeah, I think atomic there means that it won't race with other writes to
> the same byte in IRR.  We're fine as long as AVIC writes IRR before
> checking IsRunning on every destination, which it seems to be.

More precisely, if AVIC writes all IRRs (5.1) and ANDs all IsRunning
flags before checking the result of the AND (6).

> (It would, but I believe that AVIC designers made it sane and the spec
>  doesn't let me read it in a way that supports your theories.)

I hope so as well, and you've probably convinced me.  But I still think
the code is wrong in this patch.  Let's look at the spec that you pasted:

>   3. If the destination(s) is (are) logically addressed, lookup the
>      guest physical APIC IDs for each logical ID using the Logical APIC
>      ID table.  If the entry is not valid (V bit is cleared), cause a
>      #VMEXIT.  If the entry is valid, but contains an invalid backing
>      page pointer, cause a #VMEXIT.
> 
>   4. Lookup the vAPIC backing page address in the Physical APIC table using
>      the guest physical APIC ID as an index into the table.  For
>      directed interrupts, if the selected table entry is not valid,
>      cause a #VMEXIT. For broadcast IPIs, invalid entries are ignored.
> 
>   5. For every valid destination:
>      - Atomically set the appropriate IRR bit in each of the
>        destinations’ vAPIC backing page.
>      - Check the IsRunning status of each destination.
>      - If the destination IsRunning bit is set, send a doorbell message
>        using the host physical core number from the Physical APIC ID
>        table.

This is where the following steps happen:

1) destination 1 is running, so the processor sets IRR and sends a
doorbell message

2) destination 2 is a valid destination, so the processor sets IRR


In the meanwhile destination 1 is running on another VCPU so we can say
that it does the following:

3) destination 1 processes the interrupt, moving it from IRR to ISR

4) destination 1 sends an EOI


>   6. If any destinations are identified as not currently scheduled on a
>      physical core (i.e., the IsRunning bit for that virtual processor
>      is not set), cause a #VMEXIT.

Now the following happens:

5) the source exits and reinjects the interrupt (in Suravee's code, the
VMEXIT handler just writes again to ICR);

6) the KVM code has no way to know that destination 1 has serviced the
interrupt already, so destination 1 then receives the interrupt again.

So perhaps it's enough to change KVM to _not_ modify IRR on an
"incomplete IPI - target not running" vmexit, and instead only do

       kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
       kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);

on the destination VCPUs.  That would indeed be simply just be something
to fix in the patches.  Do you agree that this is a bug?

I'm curious about how often the AVIC VMEXIT fires.  Suravee, can you add
debugfs counters for the various incomplete IPI subcauses?


And since we are at it, I'm curious about the following two steps at the
end of 15.29.2.6.

- on VMRUN the interrupt state is evaluated and the highest priority
pending interrupt indicated in the IRR is delivered if interrupt masking
and priority allow

- Any doorbell signals received during VMRUN processing are recognized
immediately after entering the guest

Isn't step 1 exactly the same as evaluating the doorbell signals?  Is
the IRR evaluated only if the hypervisor had rang the doorbell, or
unconditionally?

Thanks,

Paolo

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