linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] lkdtm: add test for executing .rodata

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLKPKogHiVQJJF402g6dSs1RczzLtKJFoB=vLtg0LWQPg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 17 Feb 2016 16:46:12 -0800
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc:	Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
	Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] lkdtm: add test for executing .rodata

On Wed, Feb 17, 2016 at 1:22 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> Make sure that the read-only data section isn't executable. To avoid
> making per-architecture assembly functions, just mark the new function
> as living in the .rodata section and force the flags (which requires
> adding a comment to hide the generated flags from the assembler).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> v2:
> - fix the section bits hack to be more friendly
> ---
>  drivers/misc/lkdtm.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> index 11fdadc68e53..b15d08ff71a9 100644
> --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ enum ctype {
>         CT_EXEC_STACK,
>         CT_EXEC_KMALLOC,
>         CT_EXEC_VMALLOC,
> +       CT_EXEC_RODATA,
>         CT_EXEC_USERSPACE,
>         CT_ACCESS_USERSPACE,
>         CT_WRITE_RO,
> @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ static char* cp_type[] = {
>         "EXEC_STACK",
>         "EXEC_KMALLOC",
>         "EXEC_VMALLOC",
> +       "EXEC_RODATA",
>         "EXEC_USERSPACE",
>         "ACCESS_USERSPACE",
>         "WRITE_RO",
> @@ -315,6 +317,12 @@ static int recursive_loop(int remaining)
>                 return recursive_loop(remaining - 1);
>  }
>
> +static void __attribute__((__section__(".rodata,\"a\",\%progbits;//")))

Aaaand, nope. This fails on sparc, which doesn't know what "/" is.
Wheee. I might need to add a set of tests to compiler.h and include
the arch-specific comment character with a #define.

-Kees

> +do_nothing_rodata(void)
> +{
> +       return;
> +}
> +
>  static void do_nothing(void)
>  {
>         return;
> @@ -335,15 +343,18 @@ static noinline void corrupt_stack(void)
>         memset((void *)data, 0, 64);
>  }
>
> -static void execute_location(void *dst)
> +static void execute_location(void *dst, bool write)
>  {
>         void (*func)(void) = dst;
>
>         pr_info("attempting ok execution at %p\n", do_nothing);
>         do_nothing();
>
> -       memcpy(dst, do_nothing, EXEC_SIZE);
> -       flush_icache_range((unsigned long)dst, (unsigned long)dst + EXEC_SIZE);
> +       if (write) {
> +               memcpy(dst, do_nothing, EXEC_SIZE);
> +               flush_icache_range((unsigned long)dst,
> +                                  (unsigned long)dst + EXEC_SIZE);
> +       }
>         pr_info("attempting bad execution at %p\n", func);
>         func();
>  }
> @@ -438,25 +449,28 @@ static void lkdtm_do_action(enum ctype which)
>                 schedule();
>                 break;
>         case CT_EXEC_DATA:
> -               execute_location(data_area);
> +               execute_location(data_area, true);
>                 break;
>         case CT_EXEC_STACK: {
>                 u8 stack_area[EXEC_SIZE];
> -               execute_location(stack_area);
> +               execute_location(stack_area, true);
>                 break;
>         }
>         case CT_EXEC_KMALLOC: {
>                 u32 *kmalloc_area = kmalloc(EXEC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> -               execute_location(kmalloc_area);
> +               execute_location(kmalloc_area, true);
>                 kfree(kmalloc_area);
>                 break;
>         }
>         case CT_EXEC_VMALLOC: {
>                 u32 *vmalloc_area = vmalloc(EXEC_SIZE);
> -               execute_location(vmalloc_area);
> +               execute_location(vmalloc_area, true);
>                 vfree(vmalloc_area);
>                 break;
>         }
> +       case CT_EXEC_RODATA:
> +               execute_location(do_nothing_rodata, false);
> +               break;
>         case CT_EXEC_USERSPACE: {
>                 unsigned long user_addr;
>
> --
> 2.6.3
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security