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Message-ID: <CAAmzW4McCyLahXw2TV=OHBNwLSg2gq1Bq2n3mmaa7gLFEVGZ+w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 11:11:35 +0900
From: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@...il.com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] mm: kasan: Initial memory quarantine implementation
2016-02-18 23:06 GMT+09:00 Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>:
> On Mon, Feb 1, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 07:25:13PM +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
>>> Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are
>>> returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
>>> errors.
>>>
>>> Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues.
>>> When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects
>>> are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call
>>> allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the
>>> global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than
>>> 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed
>>> physical memory).
>>
>> Just wondering why not using time based approach rather than size
>> based one. In heavy load condition, how much time do the object stay in
>> quarantine?
>>
>>>
>>> Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
>>> Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.
>>>
>>> This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
>>> prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/kasan.h | 30 ++++--
>>> lib/test_kasan.c | 29 ++++++
>>> mm/kasan/Makefile | 2 +-
>>> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 68 +++++++++++-
>>> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 11 +-
>>> mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 284 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> mm/kasan/report.c | 3 +-
>>> mm/mempool.c | 7 +-
>>> mm/page_alloc.c | 2 +-
>>> mm/slab.c | 12 ++-
>>> mm/slab.h | 4 +
>>> mm/slab_common.c | 2 +
>>> mm/slub.c | 4 +-
>>> 13 files changed, 435 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> +bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>>> +{
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
>>> + /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
>>> + if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
>>> + return false;
>>> +
>>> + if (likely(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)) {
>>> + struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
>>> + get_alloc_info(cache, object);
>>> + struct kasan_free_meta *free_info =
>>> + get_free_info(cache, object);
>>> +
>>> + switch (alloc_info->state) {
>>> + case KASAN_STATE_ALLOC:
>>> + alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE;
>>> + quarantine_put(free_info, cache);
>>
>> quarantine_put() can be called regardless of SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU,
>> although it's not much meaningful without poisoning. But, I have an
>> idea to poison object on SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU cache.
>>
>> quarantine_put() moves per cpu list to global queue when
>> list size reaches QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE. If we call synchronize_rcu()
>> at that time, after then, we can poison objects. With appropriate size
>> setup, it would not be intrusive.
>>
> Won't this slow the quarantine down unpredictably (e.g. in the case
> there're no RCU slabs in quarantine we'll still be waiting for
> synchronize_rcu())?
It could be handled by introducing one cpu variable.
> Yet this is something worth looking into. Do you want RCU to be
> handled in this patch set?
No. It would be future work.
>>> + set_track(&free_info->track, GFP_NOWAIT);
>>
>> set_track() can be called regardless of SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU.
> Agreed, I can fix that if we decide to handle RCU in this patch
> (otherwise it will lead to confusion).
>
>>
>>> + kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
>>> + return true;
>>> + case KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE:
>>> + case KASAN_STATE_FREE:
>>> + pr_err("Double free");
>>> + dump_stack();
>>> + break;
>>> + default:
>>> + break;
>>> + }
>>> + }
>>> + return false;
>>> +#else
>>> + kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
>>> + return false;
>>> +#endif
>>> +}
>>> +
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> +void quarantine_reduce(void)
>>> +{
>>> + size_t new_quarantine_size;
>>> + unsigned long flags;
>>> + struct qlist to_free = QLIST_INIT;
>>> + size_t size_to_free = 0;
>>> + void **last;
>>> +
>>> + if (likely(ACCESS_ONCE(global_quarantine.bytes) <=
>>> + smp_load_acquire(&quarantine_size)))
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&quarantine_lock, flags);
>>> +
>>> + /* Update quarantine size in case of hotplug. Allocate a fraction of
>>> + * the installed memory to quarantine minus per-cpu queue limits.
>>> + */
>>> + new_quarantine_size = (ACCESS_ONCE(totalram_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) /
>>> + QUARANTINE_FRACTION;
>>> + new_quarantine_size -= QUARANTINE_PERCPU_SIZE * num_online_cpus();
>>> + smp_store_release(&quarantine_size, new_quarantine_size);
>>> +
>>> + last = global_quarantine.head;
>>> + while (last) {
>>> + struct kmem_cache *cache = qlink_to_cache(last);
>>> +
>>> + size_to_free += cache->size;
>>> + if (!*last || size_to_free >
>>> + global_quarantine.bytes - QUARANTINE_LOW_SIZE)
>>> + break;
>>> + last = (void **) *last;
>>> + }
>>> + qlist_move(&global_quarantine, last, &to_free, size_to_free);
>>> +
>>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&quarantine_lock, flags);
>>> +
>>> + qlist_free_all(&to_free, NULL);
>>> +}
>>
>> Isn't it better to call quarantine_reduce() in shrink_slab()?
>> It will help to maximize quarantine time.
> This is true, however if we don't call quarantine_reduce() from
> kmalloc()/kfree() the size of the quarantine will be unpredictable.
> There's a tradeoff between efficiency and space here, and at least in
> some cases we may want to trade efficiency for space.
size of the quarantine doesn't matter unless there is memory pressure.
If memory pressure, shrink_slab() would be called and we can reduce
size of quarantine. However, I don't think this is show stopper. We can
do it when needed.
Thanks.
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