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Message-ID: <lsq.1456263723.987590438@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 21:42:03 +0000
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 66/67] pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read
3.2.78-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
> It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer
> offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially
> resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user
> could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user
> space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to
3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y.
We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable
and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru
void *addr;
size_t chars = buf->len, remaining;
int error, atomic;
+ int offset;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
@@ -408,9 +409,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const stru
atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars);
remaining = chars;
+ offset = buf->offset;
redo:
addr = ops->map(pipe, buf, atomic);
- error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &buf->offset,
+ error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &offset,
&remaining, atomic);
ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr);
if (unlikely(error)) {
@@ -426,6 +428,7 @@ redo:
break;
}
ret += chars;
+ buf->offset += chars;
buf->len -= chars;
/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
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