linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.2 63/67] unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user

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Message-ID: <lsq.1456263723.281758974@decadent.org.uk>
Date:	Tue, 23 Feb 2016 21:42:03 +0000
From:	Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Willy Tarreau" <w@....eu>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	"David Herrmann" <dh.herrmann@...il.com>,
	"Hannes Frederic Sowa" <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 63/67] unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending
 process user_struct

3.2.78-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>

commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 upstream.

The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 include/net/af_unix.h | 4 ++--
 include/net/scm.h     | 1 +
 net/core/scm.c        | 7 +++++++
 net/unix/af_unix.c    | 4 ++--
 net/unix/garbage.c    | 8 ++++----
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/af_unix.h
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
-extern void unix_inflight(struct file *fp);
-extern void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp);
+extern void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+extern void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
 extern void unix_gc(void);
 extern void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
 extern struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list {
 	struct list_head	list;
 	short			count;
 	short			max;
+	struct user_struct	*user;
 	struct file		*fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
 };
 
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *c
 		*fplp = fpl;
 		fpl->count = 0;
 		fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+		fpl->user = NULL;
 	}
 	fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
 
@@ -100,6 +101,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *c
 		*fpp++ = file;
 		fpl->count++;
 	}
+
+	if (!fpl->user)
+		fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
 	return num;
 }
 
@@ -124,6 +129,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *sc
 				list_del(&fpl->list);
 				for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
 					fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+				free_uid(fpl->user);
 				kfree(fpl);
 			}
 
@@ -342,6 +348,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct sc
 		for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
 			get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
 		new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+		new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
 	}
 	return new_fpl;
 }
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_c
 	UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
 
 	for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
-		unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+		unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
 }
 
 static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1520,7 +1520,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_co
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-		unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+		unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
 	return max_level;
 }
 
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file
  *	descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
  */
 
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
 {
 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
 
@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
 		}
 		unix_tot_inflight++;
 	}
-	fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+	user->unix_inflight++;
 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }
 
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
 {
 	struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
 
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
 			list_del_init(&u->link);
 		unix_tot_inflight--;
 	}
-	fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+	user->unix_inflight--;
 	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }