linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 116/142] udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <b20777e701634754eadc8e12c492459c600161a0.1456308281.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:	Wed, 24 Feb 2016 11:05:11 +0100
From:	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@...tor.com>,
	Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 116/142] udf: Prevent buffer overrun with multi-byte characters

From: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@...tor.com>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit ad402b265ecf6fa22d04043b41444cdfcdf4f52d upstream.

udf_CS0toUTF8 function stops the conversion when the output buffer
length reaches UDF_NAME_LEN-2, which is correct maximum name length,
but, when checking, it leaves the space for a single byte only,
while multi-bytes output characters can take more space, causing
buffer overflow.

Similar error exists in udf_CS0toNLS function, that restricts
the output length to UDF_NAME_LEN, while actual maximum allowed
length is UDF_NAME_LEN-2.

In these cases the output can override not only the current buffer
length field, causing corruption of the name buffer itself, but also
following allocation structures, causing kernel crash.

Adjust the output length checks in both functions to prevent buffer
overruns in case of multi-bytes UTF8 or NLS characters.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@...tor.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 fs/udf/unicode.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/udf/unicode.c b/fs/udf/unicode.c
index d29c06fbf4ce..dd8c24a9fe74 100644
--- a/fs/udf/unicode.c
+++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c
@@ -133,11 +133,15 @@ int udf_CS0toUTF8(struct ustr *utf_o, const struct ustr *ocu_i)
 		if (c < 0x80U)
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] = (uint8_t)c;
 		else if (c < 0x800U) {
+			if (utf_o->u_len > (UDF_NAME_LEN - 4))
+				break;
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0xc0 | (c >> 6));
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0x80 | (c & 0x3f));
 		} else {
+			if (utf_o->u_len > (UDF_NAME_LEN - 5))
+				break;
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
 						(uint8_t)(0xe0 | (c >> 12));
 			utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len++] =
@@ -282,7 +286,7 @@ static int udf_CS0toNLS(struct nls_table *nls, struct ustr *utf_o,
 			c = (c << 8) | ocu[i++];

 		len = nls->uni2char(c, &utf_o->u_name[utf_o->u_len],
-				    UDF_NAME_LEN - utf_o->u_len);
+				    UDF_NAME_LEN - 2 - utf_o->u_len);
 		/* Valid character? */
 		if (len >= 0)
 			utf_o->u_len += len;
-- 
2.7.1