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Message-ID: <20160226135335.GC8728@leverpostej>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 13:53:36 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc: adech.fo@...il.com, dvyukov@...gle.com, ryabinin.a.a@...il.com,
will.deacon@....com, catalin.marinas@....com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] kasan, arm64: Unpoison dirty stack frames when
resuming from suspend.
Hi,
On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 01:38:37PM +0100, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> Before an ARM64 CPU is suspended, the kernel saves the context which will
> be used to initialize the register state upon resume. After that and
> before the actual execution of the SMC instruction the kernel creates
> several stack frames which are never unpoisoned because arm_smccc_smc()
> does not return. This may cause false positive stack buffer overflow
> reports from KASAN.
>
> The solution is to record the stack pointer value just before the CPU is
> suspended, and unpoison the part of stack between the saved value and
> the stack pointer upon resume.
Thanks for looking into this! That's much appreciated.
I think the general approach (unposioning the stack upon cold return to
the kernel) is fine, but I have concerns with the implementation, which
I've noted below.
The problem also applies for hotplug, as leftover poison from the
hot-unplug path isn't cleaned before a CPU is hotplugged back on. The
first few functions are likely deterministic in their stack usage, so
it's not seen with a defconfig, but I think it's possible to trigger,
and it's also a cross-architecture problem shared with x86.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c | 5 +++++
> drivers/firmware/psci.c | 5 +++++
> include/linux/kasan.h | 5 +++++
> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
> index 1095aa4..1070415 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c
> @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
> #include <linux/ftrace.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> @@ -117,6 +118,10 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
> */
> if (hw_breakpoint_restore)
> hw_breakpoint_restore(NULL);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> + /* Unpoison the stack above the current frame. */
> + kasan_cpu_resume();
> +#endif
I think this is too late. Since we returned from __cpu_suspend_enter we
have called several functions, any of which may have touched the stack,
and could have hit stale poison.
Do we have any strong guarantee that the compiler won't (in future)
extend the current stack frame arbitrarily? I can imagine that happening
if the compiler does some interprocedural analysis and/or splits this
function into specialised parts.
Given that, I think it's possible to hit stale poison even in the
current function, and I'm not keen on having the kasan_cpu_resume call
within cpu_suspend due to that.
If we're going to unpoison the stack upon re-entry to the kernel, I
think that has to happen in the return path of __cpu_suspend_enter.
> }
>
> unpause_graph_tracing();
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/psci.c b/drivers/firmware/psci.c
> index f25cd79..2480189 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/psci.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/psci.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
> #include <linux/errno.h>
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
> #include <linux/linkage.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> #include <linux/pm.h>
> @@ -122,6 +123,10 @@ static unsigned long __invoke_psci_fn_smc(unsigned long function_id,
> {
> struct arm_smccc_res res;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> + /* Notify KASAN it should unpoison the stack up to this point. */
> + kasan_stack_watermark();
> +#endif
Similarly to the comment above, I'm not sure this necessarily gives us
an accurate bound in all cases, and could easily be perturbed by
other compiler instrumentation/optimisation/specialisation.
If we go ahead with unpoisoning rather than moving functions into
uninstrumented compilation units, I think we have to clear everything
from the end of the current thread_info up to the SP in
__cpu_suspend_enter.
> arm_smccc_smc(function_id, arg0, arg1, arg2, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
> return res.a0;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 4b9f85c..d4fd7a4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ void kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
> int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size);
> void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
> +void kasan_stack_watermark(void);
> +void kasan_cpu_resume(void);
> +#endif
> +
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index bc0a8d8..6529d345 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -550,3 +550,35 @@ static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
>
> module_init(kasan_memhotplug_init);
> #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_stack_watermark);
> +
> +/* Record the stack pointer before the CPU is suspended. The recorded value
> + * will be used upon resume to unpoison the dirty stack frames.
> + */
> +void kasan_stack_watermark(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long *watermark = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_stack_watermark);
> +
> + *watermark = __builtin_frame_address(0);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_stack_watermark);
> +
> +void kasan_cpu_resume(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long sp = __builtin_frame_address(0);
> + unsigned long *watermark = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_stack_watermark);
> +
> + if (*watermark == 0) {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(*watermark == 0);
> + *watermark = sp;
> + return;
> + }
> + if (sp > *watermark) {
> + kasan_unpoison_shadow(*watermark, sp - *watermark);
> + *watermark = 0;
> + }
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kasan_cpu_resume);
> +#endif
As above, we'll need to clear the entire stack upon hotplug on all
architectures, and this should probably be reused for that (and shared
with other architectures).
Thanks,
Mark.
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