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Message-Id: <20160301234538.788825162@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 23:55:37 +0000
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
<stable@...r.kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 338/342] security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
commit 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 upstream.
It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode
can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but
only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch,
all modes have flags ORed into them.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++-----
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -398,12 +398,10 @@ static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_
*/
static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
{
- switch (mode) {
- case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
- return MAY_READ;
- case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
return MAY_READWRITE;
- }
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+ return MAY_READ;
return 0;
}
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
int rc = 0;
/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
- if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
switch (ptrace_scope) {
case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
/* No additional restrictions. */
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(stru
}
}
- if (rc) {
+ if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);
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