linux-kernel - [PATCH 2.6.32 13/55] vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify

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Message-Id: <20160304153001.279810337@1wt.eu>
Date:	Fri, 04 Mar 2016 16:30:13 +0100
From:	Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@...oo.co.in>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Subject: [PATCH 2.6.32 13/55] vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area
 helpers

2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>

commit a70b52ec1aaeaf60f4739edb1b422827cb6f3893 upstream.

We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.

Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.

This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.

Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@...oo.co.in>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
---
 fs/aio.c | 30 ++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 22a19ad..5030dc6 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1389,6 +1389,10 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(int type, struct kiocb *kiocb)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	ret = rw_verify_area(type, kiocb->ki_filp, &kiocb->ki_pos, ret);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	kiocb->ki_nr_segs = kiocb->ki_nbytes;
 	kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
 	/* ki_nbytes/left now reflect bytes instead of segs */
@@ -1400,11 +1404,17 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(struct kiocb *kiocb)
+static ssize_t aio_setup_single_vector(int type, struct file * file, struct kiocb *kiocb)
 {
+	int bytes;
+
+	bytes = rw_verify_area(type, file, &kiocb->ki_pos, kiocb->ki_left);
+	if (bytes < 0)
+		return bytes;
+
 	kiocb->ki_iovec = &kiocb->ki_inline_vec;
 	kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_base = kiocb->ki_buf;
-	kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = kiocb->ki_left;
+	kiocb->ki_iovec->iov_len = bytes;
 	kiocb->ki_nr_segs = 1;
 	kiocb->ki_cur_seg = 0;
 	return 0;
@@ -1429,10 +1439,7 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb)
 		if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kiocb->ki_buf,
 			kiocb->ki_left)))
 			break;
-		ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
-		if (unlikely(ret))
-			break;
-		ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
+		ret = aio_setup_single_vector(READ, file, kiocb);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 		ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1447,10 +1454,7 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb)
 		if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, kiocb->ki_buf,
 			kiocb->ki_left)))
 			break;
-		ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
-		if (unlikely(ret))
-			break;
-		ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
+		ret = aio_setup_single_vector(WRITE, file, kiocb);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 		ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1461,9 +1465,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb)
 		ret = -EBADF;
 		if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
 			break;
-		ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
-		if (unlikely(ret))
-			break;
 		ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(READ, kiocb);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
@@ -1475,9 +1476,6 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb)
 		ret = -EBADF;
 		if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
 			break;
-		ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
-		if (unlikely(ret))
-			break;
 		ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(WRITE, kiocb);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
-- 
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty