linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: disable PEBS before a guest entry

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Message-ID: <CALzav=dVq4os_AKMWsjtytFu96BGzMAY3rDEs-UdFgzd8Q-GSg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 4 Mar 2016 09:25:35 -0800
From:	David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>
To:	Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc:	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	Jiří Olša <jolsa@...hat.com>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: disable PEBS before a guest entry

On Fri, Mar 4, 2016 at 6:08 AM, Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com> wrote:
> Linux guests on Haswell (and also SandyBridge and Broadwell, at least)
> would crash if you decided to run a host command that uses PEBS, like
>   perf record -e 'cpu/mem-stores/pp' -a
>
> This happens because KVM is using VMX MSR switching to disable PEBS, but
> SDM [2015-12] 18.4.4.4 Re-configuring PEBS Facilities explains why it
> isn't safe:
>   When software needs to reconfigure PEBS facilities, it should allow a
>   quiescent period between stopping the prior event counting and setting
>   up a new PEBS event. The quiescent period is to allow any latent
>   residual PEBS records to complete its capture at their previously
>   specified buffer address (provided by IA32_DS_AREA).
>
> There might not be a quiescent period after the MSR switch, so a CPU
> ends up using host's MSR_IA32_DS_AREA to access an area in guest's
> memory.  (Or MSR switching is just buggy on some models.)
>
> The guest can learn something about the host this way:
> If the guest doesn't map address pointed by MSR_IA32_DS_AREA, it results
> in #PF where we leak host's MSR_IA32_DS_AREA through CR2.
>
> After that, a malicious guest can map and configure memory where
> MSR_IA32_DS_AREA is pointing and can therefore get an output from
> host's tracing.
>
> This is not a critical leak as the host must initiate with PEBS tracing
> and I have not been able to get a record from more than one instruction
> before vmentry in vmx_vcpu_run() (that place has most registers already
> overwritten with guest's).
>
> We could disable PEBS just few instructions before vmentry, but
> disabling it earlier shouldn't affect host tracing too much.
> We also don't need to switch MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE on VMENTRY, but that
> optimization isn't worth its code, IMO.
>
> (If you are implementing PEBS for guests, be sure to handle the case
>  where both host and guest enable PEBS, because this patch doesn't.)
>
> Fixes: 26a4f3c08de4 ("perf/x86: disable PEBS on a guest entry.")
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
> Reported-by: Jiří Olša <jolsa@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>

Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>

BTW the commit message is great. Thanks for including so much detail.

> ---
>  v2
>   - moved code to add_atomic_switch_msr, so the patch will work [David]
>   - more appropriate "KVM: VMX:" in subject
>  v1: http://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg128808.html
>
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 7 +++++++
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index 46154dac71e6..e5572696c9e3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -1822,6 +1822,13 @@ static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
>                         return;
>                 }
>                 break;
> +       case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
> +               /* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
> +                * a record).  Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
> +                * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
> +                * guest's memory.
> +                */
> +               wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
>         }
>
>         for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i)
> --
> 2.7.2
>