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Message-Id: <c7b7efc9e2e1e14f416b9736b95f90e47c4557b3.1457243356.git.luto@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2016 21:52:20 -0800
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: x86@...nel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/10] x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF handling
Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF. As a result,
if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the
kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can
do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1].
Simplify the handling considerably with two changes:
1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can
add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever.
2. Teach do_debug to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue.
That's all we need to do.
Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit
kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but
the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first
instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite
correctly. The next two patches will fix that.
[1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and
making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER
code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 9 ++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 15 ++++++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
4 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index a8c3424c3392..7700cf695d8c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -287,7 +287,26 @@ need_resched:
END(resume_kernel)
#endif
- # SYSENTER call handler stub
+GLOBAL(__begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region)
+/*
+ * All code from here through __end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region is subject
+ * to being single-stepped if a user program sets TF and executes SYSENTER.
+ * There is absolutely nothing that we can do to prevent this from happening
+ * (thanks Intel!). To keep our handling of this situation as simple as
+ * possible, we handle TF just like AC and NT, except that our #DB handler
+ * will ignore all of the single-step traps generated in this range.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
+/*
+ * Xen doesn't set %esp to be precisely what the normal SYSENTER
+ * entry point expects, so fix it up before using the normal path.
+ */
+ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target)
+ addl $5*4, %esp /* remove xen-provided frame */
+ jmp sysenter_past_esp
+#endif
+
ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
movl TSS_sysenter_sp0(%esp), %esp
sysenter_past_esp:
@@ -301,19 +320,25 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS /* save rest */
/*
- * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
- * ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
+ * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT, AC
+ * and TF ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
* either was set instead of doing an unconditional popfq.
* This needs to happen before enabling interrupts so that
* we don't get preempted with NT set.
*
+ * If TF is set, we will single-step all the way to here -- do_debug
+ * will ignore all the traps. (Yes, this is slow, but so is
+ * single-stepping in general. This allows us to avoid having
+ * a more complicated code to handle the case where a user program
+ * forces us to single-step through the SYSENTER entry code.)
+ *
* NB.: .Lsysenter_fix_flags is a label with the code under it moved
* out-of-line as an optimization: NT is unlikely to be set in the
* majority of the cases and instead of polluting the I$ unnecessarily,
* we're keeping that code behind a branch which will predict as
* not-taken and therefore its instructions won't be fetched.
*/
- testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC, PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
+ testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_TF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
jnz .Lsysenter_fix_flags
.Lsysenter_flags_fixed:
@@ -369,6 +394,7 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
pushl $X86_EFLAGS_FIXED
popfl
jmp .Lsysenter_flags_fixed
+GLOBAL(__end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region)
ENDPROC(entry_SYSENTER_32)
# system call handler stub
@@ -662,14 +688,6 @@ ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug)
END(spurious_interrupt_bug)
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
-/*
- * Xen doesn't set %esp to be precisely what the normal SYSENTER
- * entry point expects, so fix it up before using the normal path.
- */
-ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target)
- addl $5*4, %esp /* remove xen-provided frame */
- jmp sysenter_past_esp
-
ENTRY(xen_hypervisor_callback)
pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
SAVE_ALL
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 8d3728131809..26469c11796d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -94,13 +94,19 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
* This needs to happen before enabling interrupts so that
* we don't get preempted with NT set.
*
+ * If TF is set, we will single-step all the way to here -- do_debug
+ * will ignore all the traps. (Yes, this is slow, but so is
+ * single-stepping in general. This allows us to avoid having
+ * a more complicated code to handle the case where a user program
+ * forces us to single-step through the SYSENTER entry code.)
+ *
* NB.: .Lsysenter_fix_flags is a label with the code under it moved
* out-of-line as an optimization: NT is unlikely to be set in the
* majority of the cases and instead of polluting the I$ unnecessarily,
* we're keeping that code behind a branch which will predict as
* not-taken and therefore its instructions won't be fetched.
*/
- testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC, EFLAGS(%rsp)
+ testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_TF, EFLAGS(%rsp)
jnz .Lsysenter_fix_flags
.Lsysenter_flags_fixed:
@@ -121,6 +127,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
pushq $X86_EFLAGS_FIXED
popfq
jmp .Lsysenter_flags_fixed
+GLOBAL(__end_entry_SYSENTER_compat)
ENDPROC(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
index a4a77286cb1d..9b9b30b19441 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h
@@ -7,12 +7,23 @@
void syscall_init(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
void entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
-void entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
void entry_INT80_32(void);
-void entry_INT80_compat(void);
void entry_SYSENTER_32(void);
+void __begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region(void);
+void __end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
void entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
+void __end_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
+void entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
+void entry_INT80_compat(void);
+#endif
void x86_configure_nx(void);
void x86_report_nx(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 6dddc220e3ed..80928ea78373 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -559,6 +559,29 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(fixup_bad_iret);
#endif
+static bool is_sysenter_singlestep(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't try for precision here. If we're anywhere in the region of
+ * code that can be single-stepped in the SYSENTER entry path, then
+ * assume that this is a useless single-step trap due to SYSENTER
+ * being invoked with TF set. (We don't know in advance exactly
+ * which instructions will be hit because BTF could plausibly
+ * be set.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ return (regs->ip - (unsigned long)__begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region) <
+ (unsigned long)__end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region -
+ (unsigned long)__begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
+ return (regs->ip - (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_compat) <
+ (unsigned long)__end_entry_SYSENTER_compat -
+ (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_compat;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Our handling of the processor debug registers is non-trivial.
* We do not clear them on entry and exit from the kernel. Therefore
@@ -616,6 +639,18 @@ dotraplinkage void do_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
+ if (unlikely(!user_mode(regs) && (dr6 & DR_STEP) &&
+ is_sysenter_singlestep(regs))) {
+ dr6 &= ~DR_STEP;
+ if (!dr6)
+ goto exit;
+ /*
+ * else we might have gotten a single-step trap and hit a
+ * watchpoint at the same time, in which case we should fall
+ * through and handle the watchpoint.
+ */
+ }
+
/*
* If dr6 has no reason to give us about the origin of this trap,
* then it's very likely the result of an icebp/int01 trap.
@@ -624,7 +659,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
if (!dr6 && user_mode(regs))
user_icebp = 1;
- /* Catch kmemcheck conditions first of all! */
+ /* Catch kmemcheck conditions! */
if ((dr6 & DR_STEP) && kmemcheck_trap(regs))
goto exit;
@@ -659,14 +694,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
goto exit;
}
- /*
- * Single-stepping through system calls: ignore any exceptions in
- * kernel space, but re-enable TF when returning to user mode.
- *
- * We already checked v86 mode above, so we can check for kernel mode
- * by just checking the CPL of CS.
- */
- if ((dr6 & DR_STEP) && !user_mode(regs)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE((dr6 & DR_STEP) && !user_mode(regs))) {
+ /*
+ * Historical junk that used to handle SYSENTER single-stepping.
+ * This should be unreachable now. If we survive for a while
+ * without anyone hitting this warning, we'll turn this into
+ * an oops.
+ */
tsk->thread.debugreg6 &= ~DR_STEP;
set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
regs->flags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
--
2.5.0
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