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Message-ID: <CALCETrVAkRXQVot0KfJxxCxYtakHAvPsmdqpojgBF_CV_6FFpA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Mon, 7 Mar 2016 13:02:14 -0800
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc:	Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	dingel@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, bob.picco@...cle.com,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
	Rob Gardner <rob.gardner@...cle.com>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.cz>, chris.hyser@...cle.com,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
	Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@...il.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
	xiexiuqi@...wei.com, Vineet.Gupta1@...opsys.com,
	Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Benjamin Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@...olabs.net>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] sparc64: Add support for Application Data Integrity (ADI)

On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 12:58 PM, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> wrote:
> From: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@...cle.com>
> Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 13:41:39 -0700
>
>> Shared data may not always be backed by a file. My understanding is
>> one of the use cases is for in-memory databases. This shared space
>> could also be used to hand off transactions in flight to other
>> processes. These transactions in flight would not be backed by a
>> file. Some of these use cases might not use shmfs even. Setting ADI
>> bits at virtual address level catches all these cases since what backs
>> the tagged virtual address can be anything - a mapped file, mmio
>> space, just plain chunk of memory.
>
> Frankly the most interesting use case to me is simply finding bugs
> and memory scribbles, and for that we're want to be able to ADI
> arbitrary memory returned from malloc() and friends.
>
> I personally see ADI more as a debugging than a security feature,
> but that's just my view.

The thing that seems awkward to me is that setting, say, ADI=1 seems
almost equivalent to remapping the memory up to 0x10...whatever, and
the latter is a heck of a lot simpler to think about.

-- 
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC

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