linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALCETrVf1uSKJh7zENOgHW6et0wed5goU6AfaTB5RSiBhbCfeA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 8 Mar 2016 13:57:40 -0800
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Scotty Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu>
Cc:	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	wmealing@...hat.com, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
	Abhiram Balasubramanian <abhiram@...utah.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for
 signal cookies

On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:49 PM, Scotty Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu> wrote:
>
>
> On 03/08/2016 01:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu> wrote:
>>> This patch adds a per-process secret to the task struct which
>>> will be used during signal delivery and during a sigreturn.
>>> Also, logic is added in signal.c to generate, place, extract,
>>> clear and verify the signal cookie.
>>>
>>
>> Potentially silly question: it's been a while since I read the SROP
>> paper, but would the technique be effectively mitigated if sigreturn
>> were to zero out the whole signal frame before returning to user mode?
>>
>
> I don't know if I fully understand your question, but I'll respond anyway.
>
> SROP is possible because the kernel doesn't know whether or not the
> incoming sigreturn syscall is in response from a legitimate signal that
> the kernel had previously delivered and the program handled. So essentially
> these patches are an attempt to give the kernel a way to verify whether or
> not the the incoming sigreturn is a valid response or a exploit trying to
> hijack control of the user program.
>

I got that part, but I thought that the interesting SROP bit was using
sigreturn to return back to a frame where you could just repeat the
sigreturn a bunch of times to compute things and do other evil.  I'm
wondering whether zeroing the whole frame would make SROP much less
interesting to an attacker.

--Andy