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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLu5NFw=7xoJEYcAq7MFwGY1nuB8w-q+NVp2d2zpwRUyQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2016 16:41:39 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
David Brown <david.brown@...aro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] s390, postinit-readonly: implement post-init RO
On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 4:20 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> Since s390 already sets its .rodata section RO from the start, the generic
> .data..ro_after_init section is already RO before init runs. For s390,
> split the post-init read-only section off separately and handle that
> when the call to mark_rodata_ro() is made.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> This is totally untested...
> ---
> arch/s390/Kconfig | 3 +++
> arch/s390/include/asm/cache.h | 2 ++
> arch/s390/include/asm/sections.h | 2 +-
> arch/s390/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 6 ++++++
> arch/s390/mm/init.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> index 3be9c832dec1..3f8b96f2cd2d 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ config PCI_QUIRKS
> config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
> def_bool y
>
> +config DEBUG_RODATA
> + def_bool y
> +
> config S390
> def_bool y
> select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE
> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/cache.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/cache.h
> index 4d7ccac5fd1d..816c2964bbee 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/cache.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/cache.h
> @@ -15,4 +15,6 @@
>
> #define __read_mostly __attribute__((__section__(".data..read_mostly")))
>
> +#define __ro_after_init __attribute__((__section__(".arch_ro_after_init")))
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/sections.h
> index fbd9116eb17b..6cc6acf87416 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/sections.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/sections.h
> @@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
>
> #include <asm-generic/sections.h>
>
> -extern char _eshared[], _ehead[];
> +extern char _eshared[], _ehead[], __ro_after_init[];
0day points out this should be _ro_after_init
>
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/s390/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> index 445657fe658c..39a2c7e4cdd2 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ SECTIONS
>
> RW_DATA_SECTION(0x100, PAGE_SIZE, THREAD_SIZE)
>
> + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE)
> + __ro_after_init = .;
and here
> + .arch_ro_after_init : {
> + *(.arch_ro_after_init) /* Read only after init */
> + }
> +
> _edata = .; /* End of data section */
>
> /* will be freed after init */
> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> index 73e290337092..6033d396b96c 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> @@ -136,6 +136,16 @@ void free_initmem(void)
> free_initmem_default(POISON_FREE_INITMEM);
> }
>
> +void mark_rodata_ro(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long start = (unsigned long) &__ro_after_init;
and here. :)
> + unsigned long end = (unsigned long) &_edata;
> +
> + printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting post-init read-only data: %luk\n",
> + (end - start) >> 10);
> + set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +}
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
> void __init free_initrd_mem(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> {
> --
> 2.6.3
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
I will go try Andy's virtme next... ;)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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