linux-kernel - [PATCH 1/2] KVM: MMU: fix ept=0/pte.u=0/pte.w=0/CR0.WP=0/CR4.SMEP=1/EFER.NX=0 combo

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Message-Id: <1457437467-65707-2-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Date:	Tue,  8 Mar 2016 12:44:26 +0100
From:	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...hat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: MMU: fix ept=0/pte.u=0/pte.w=0/CR0.WP=0/CR4.SMEP=1/EFER.NX=0 combo

Yes, all of these are needed. :) This is admittedly a bit odd, but
kvm-unit-tests access.flat tests this if you run it with "-cpu host"
and of course ept=0.

KVM handles supervisor writes of a pte.u=0/pte.w=0/CR0.WP=0 page by
setting U=0 and W=1 in the shadow PTE.  This will cause a user write
to fault and a supervisor write to succeed (which is correct because
CR0.WP=0).  A user read instead will flip U=0 to 1 and W=1 back to 0.
This enables user reads; it also disables supervisor writes, the next
of which will then flip the bits again.

When SMEP is in effect, however, U=0 will enable kernel execution of
this page.  To avoid this, KVM also sets NX=1 in the shadow PTE together
with U=0.  If the guest has not enabled NX, the result is a continuous
stream of page faults due to the NX bit being reserved.

The fix is to force EFER.NX=1 even if the CPU is taking care of the EFER
switch.

There is another bug in the reserved bit check, which I've split to a
separate patch for easier application to stable kernels.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Fixes: f6577a5fa15d82217ca73c74cd2dcbc0f6c781dd
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
---
 Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
index daf9c0f742d2..c81731096a43 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ In the first case there are two additional complications:
 - if CR4.SMEP is enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page,
   the kernel may now execute it.  We handle this by also setting spte.nx.
   If we get a user fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and
-  spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
+  spte.nx=gpte.nx back.  For this to work, KVM forces EFER.NX to 1 when
+  shadow paging is in use.
 - if CR4.SMAP is disabled: since the page has been changed to a kernel
   page, it can not be reused when CR4.SMAP is enabled. We set
   CR4.SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role to avoid this case. Note,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 6e51493ff4f9..91830809d837 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -1863,20 +1863,20 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
 	guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
 
 	/*
-	 * NX is emulated; LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless
-	 * outside long mode
+	 * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
 	 */
-	ignore_bits = EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
+	ignore_bits = EFER_SCE;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
 	/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
 	if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
 		ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
 #endif
-	guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
-	guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
-	vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
-	vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
+	/* NX is needed to handle CR0.WP=1, CR4.SMEP=1.  */
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
+		ignore_bits |= EFER_NX;
+	}
 
 	clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
 
@@ -1887,16 +1887,21 @@ static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
 	 */
 	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer ||
 	    (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
-		guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
 		if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
 			guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
 		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
 			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
 					      guest_efer, host_efer);
 		return false;
-	}
+	} else {
+		guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
+		guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
 
-	return true;
+		vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
+		vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
+
+		return true;
+	}
 }
 
 static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
-- 
1.8.3.1