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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+ZduNvorq5xW5J_NWzN6XQG16Q6_ir5JS1TOfeoFqaMg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 13:05:26 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@....es>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@....es>,
Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32.
On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 12:53 PM, Arjan van de Ven
<arjan@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>> Arjan, or other folks, can you remember why x86_32 disabled mmap
>> randomization here? There doesn't seem to be a good reason for it that
>> I see.
>
>
> for unlimited stack it got really messy with threaded apps.
Seems like it'd only cause problems for really really giant processes?
(I think it's telling that the other 32-bit archs don't disable ASLR
in this case...)
> anyway, I don't mind seeing if this will indeed work, with time running out
> where 32 bit is going extinct... in a few years we just won't have enough
> testing on this kind of change anymore.
Sounds good. Ingo, can you pull this in and we can try it for -next?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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