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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Y2TTbLmCshV3t8GU_iMTK_ZRv8PdidXd+3s1C0cd=dw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 13:25:49 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, lasse.collin@...aani.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support On Tue, Mar 22, 2016 at 12:31 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> wrote: > ***Background: > Previously a bug is reported that kdump didn't work when kaslr is enabled. During > discussing that bug fix, we found current kaslr has a limilation that it can > only randomize in 1GB region. > > This is because in curent kaslr implementaion only physical address of kernel > loading is randomized. Then calculate the delta of physical address where > vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If delta is not > equal to 0, namely there's a new physical address where kernel is actually > decompressed, relocation handling need be done. Then delta is added to offset > of kernel symbol relocation, this makes the address of kernel text mapping move > delta long. Though in principle kernel can be randomized to any physical address, > kernel text mapping address space is limited and only 1G, namely as follows on > x86_64: > [0xffffffff80000000, 0xffffffffc0000000) > > In one word, kernel text physical address and virtual address randomization is > coupled. This causes the limitation. > > Then hpa and Vivek suggested we should change this. To decouple the physical > address and virtual address randomization of kernel text and let them work > separately. Then kernel text physical address can be randomized in region > [16M, 64T), and kernel text virtual address can be randomized in region > [0xffffffff80000000, 0xffffffffc0000000). > > ***Problems we need solved: > - For kernel boot from startup_32 case, only 0~4G identity mapping is built. > If kernel will be randomly put anywhere from 16M to 64T at most, the price > to build all region of identity mapping is too high. We need build the > identity mapping on demand, not covering all physical address space. > > - Decouple the physical address and virtual address randomization of kernel > text and let them work separately. > > ***Parts: > - The 1st part is Yinghai's identity mapping building on demand patches. > This is used to solve the first problem mentioned above. > (Patch 09-10/19) > - The 2nd part is decoupling the physical address and virtual address > randomization of kernel text and letting them work separately patches > based on Yinghai's ident mapping patches. > (Patch 12-19/19) > - The 3rd part is some clean up patches which Yinghai found when he reviewed > my patches and the related code around. > (Patch 01-08/19) > > ***Patch status: > This patchset went through several rounds of review. > > v1: > - The first round can be found here: > https://lwn.net/Articles/637115/ > > v1->v2: > - In 2nd round Yinghai made a big patchset including this kaslr fix and another > setup_data related fix. The link is here: > http://lists-archives.com/linux-kernel/28346903-x86-updated-patches-for-kaslr-and-setup_data-etc-for-v4-3.html > You can get the code from Yinghai's git branch: > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/yinghai/linux-yinghai.git for-x86-v4.3-next > > v2->v3: > - It only takes care of the kaslr related patches. > For reviewers it's better to discuss only one issue in one thread. > * I take off one patch as follows from Yinghai's because I think it's unnecessay. > - Patch 05/19 x86, kaslr: rename output_size to output_run_size > output_size is enough to represen the value: > output_len > run_size ? output_len : run_size > > * I add Patch 04/19, it's a comment update patch. For other patches, I just > adjust patch log and do several places of change comparing with 2nd round. > Please check the change log under patch log of each patch for details. > > * Adjust sequence of several patches to make review easier. It doesn't > affect codes. > > v3->v4: > - Made changes according to Kees's comments. > Add one patch 20/20 as Kees suggested to use KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as offset > max of virtual random, meanwhile clean up useless CONFIG_RANDOM_OFFSET_MAX > > x86, kaslr: Use KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as the offset max for kernel virtual randomization This series is looking good to me. I'm running tests under qemu now, and things appear to work as advertised. :) I'll report back once I've booted a few hundred times. Ingo, what do you think of getting this into the x86 tree for some testing in -next? For stuff I haven't already Acked, consider the whole series as: Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> -Kees > > You can also get this patchset from my github: > https://github.com/baoquan-he/linux.git kaslr-above-4G > > Any comments about code changes, code comments, patch logs are welcome and > appreciated. > > Baoquan He (9): > x86, kaslr: Fix a bug that relocation can not be handled when kernel > is loaded above 2G > x86, kaskr: Update the description for decompressor worst case > x86, kaslr: Introduce struct slot_area to manage randomization slot > info > x86, kaslr: Add two functions which will be used later > x86, kaslr: Introduce fetch_random_virt_offset to randomize the kernel > text mapping address > x86, kaslr: Randomize physical and virtual address of kernel > separately > x86, kaslr: Add support of kernel physical address randomization above > 4G > x86, kaslr: Remove useless codes > x86, kaslr: Use KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE as the offset max for kernel virtual > randomization > > Yinghai Lu (11): > x86, kaslr: Remove not needed parameter for choose_kernel_location > x86, boot: Move compressed kernel to end of buffer before > decompressing > x86, boot: Move z_extract_offset calculation to header.S > x86, boot: Fix run_size calculation > x86, kaslr: Clean up useless code related to run_size. > x86, kaslr: Get correct max_addr for relocs pointer > x86, kaslr: Consolidate mem_avoid array filling > x86, boot: Split kernel_ident_mapping_init to another file > x86, 64bit: Set ident_mapping for kaslr > x86, boot: Add checking for memcpy > x86, kaslr: Allow random address to be below loaded address > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 57 +++---- > arch/x86/boot/Makefile | 13 +- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 19 ++- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c | 300 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 14 +- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 15 +- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 89 +++++----- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 34 ++-- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc_pgt.c | 93 ++++++++++ > arch/x86/boot/compressed/mkpiggy.c | 28 +-- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/string.c | 29 +++- > arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + > arch/x86/boot/header.S | 22 ++- > arch/x86/include/asm/boot.h | 19 +++ > arch/x86/include/asm/page.h | 5 + > arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 5 +- > arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + > arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 74 ++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/init_32.c | 3 - > arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 74 +------- > arch/x86/tools/calc_run_size.sh | 42 ----- > 22 files changed, 605 insertions(+), 333 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc_pgt.c > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c > delete mode 100644 arch/x86/tools/calc_run_size.sh > > -- > 2.5.0 > -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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