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Message-Id: <1459199662-16558-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Mon, 28 Mar 2016 14:14:17 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@....samsung.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@...aro.org>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This provides the mini-LSM "loadpin" that intercepts the now consolidated
kernel_file_read LSM hook so that a system can keep all loads coming from
a single trusted filesystem. This is what Chrome OS uses to pin kernel
module and firmware loading to the read-only crypto-verified dm-verity
partition so that kernel module signing is not needed.
-Kees
v2:
- break out utility helpers into separate functions
- have Yama use new helpers too
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