linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima

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Date:	Fri, 01 Apr 2016 15:33:33 +0100
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #3]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> The only place where  "KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION" is specified is in
> load_system_certificate_list(), when adding keys to
> the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring.  There is no other set of keys
> builtin and added to the IMA keyring.

Are the keys loaded by integrity_load_x509() required to be validly signed by
the builtin/secondary keys?  Or is that unnecessary given that they are loaded
and thus protected through integrity_read_file()?

David