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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZF=ectYREkynnCX_V-MMLWN+Z1Mvz-LVe7UnzbNrjMT6A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2016 08:28:58 -0700
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
Thanks for the feedback Kees. I am preparing another RFC version.
For the config, I plan on creating an equivalent option for SLUB. Both
can benefit from randomizing their freelist order.
Thomas
On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 2:45 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
> > SLAB freelist.
>
> It may be useful to describe _how_ it randomizes it (i.e. a high-level
> description of what needed changing).
>
> > This security feature reduces the predictability of
> > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows.
>
> I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can
> find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer
> to it.
>
> > Randomized lists are pre-computed using a Fisher-Yates shuffle and
>
> Should the use of Fisher-Yates (over other things) be justified?
>
> > re-used on slab creation for performance.
>
> I'd like to see some benchmark results for this so the Kconfig can
> include the performance characteristics. I recommend using hackbench
> and kernel build times with a before/after comparison.
>
> > ---
> > Based on next-20160405
> > ---
> > init/Kconfig | 9 ++++
> > mm/slab.c | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> > index 0dfd09d..ee35418 100644
> > --- a/init/Kconfig
> > +++ b/init/Kconfig
> > @@ -1742,6 +1742,15 @@ config SLOB
> >
> > endchoice
> >
> > +config FREELIST_RANDOM
>
> I think I would name this "SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM" since it's
> SLAB-specific, unless you think it could be extended to the other
> allocators in the future too? (If so, I'd mention the naming choice in
> the commit log.)
>
> > + default n
> > + depends on SLAB
> > + bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
> > + help
> > + Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new SLABs. This
> > + security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
> > + allocator against heap overflows.
> > +
> > config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL
> > default y
> > depends on SLUB && SMP
> > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
> > index b70aabf..6f0d7be 100644
> > --- a/mm/slab.c
> > +++ b/mm/slab.c
> > @@ -1229,6 +1229,59 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM
> > +/*
> > + * Master lists are pre-computed random lists
> > + * Lists of different sizes are used to optimize performance on different
> > + * SLAB object sizes per pages.
> > + */
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128];
> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256];
> > +static struct m_list {
> > + size_t count;
> > + freelist_idx_t *list;
> > +} master_lists[] = {
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 },
> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 },
> > +};
> > +
> > +void __init freelist_random_init(void)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int seed;
> > + size_t z, i, rand;
> > + struct rnd_state slab_rand;
> > +
> > + get_random_bytes_arch(&seed, sizeof(seed));
> > + prandom_seed_state(&slab_rand, seed);
> > +
> > + for (z = 0; z < ARRAY_SIZE(master_lists); z++) {
> > + for (i = 0; i < master_lists[z].count; i++)
> > + master_lists[z].list[i] = i;
> > +
> > + /* Fisher-Yates shuffle */
> > + for (i = master_lists[z].count - 1; i > 0; i--) {
> > + rand = prandom_u32_state(&slab_rand);
> > + rand %= (i + 1);
> > + swap(master_lists[z].list[i],
> > + master_lists[z].list[rand]);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +}
>
> For below...
>
> #else
> static inline freelist_random_init(void) { }
>
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */
> > +
> > +
> > /*
> > * Initialisation. Called after the page allocator have been initialised and
> > * before smp_init().
> > @@ -1255,6 +1308,10 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
> > if (!slab_max_order_set && totalram_pages > (32 << 20) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
> > slab_max_order = SLAB_MAX_ORDER_HI;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM
> > + freelist_random_init();
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */
>
> Rather than these embedded ifdefs, I would create stub function at the
> top, as above.
>
> > +
> > /* Bootstrap is tricky, because several objects are allocated
> > * from caches that do not exist yet:
> > * 1) initialize the kmem_cache cache: it contains the struct
> > @@ -2442,6 +2499,98 @@ static void cache_init_objs_debug(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page)
> > #endif
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM
> > +enum master_type {
> > + match,
> > + less,
> > + more
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct random_mng {
> > + unsigned int padding;
> > + unsigned int pos;
> > + unsigned int count;
> > + struct m_list master_list;
> > + unsigned int master_count;
> > + enum master_type type;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static void random_mng_initialize(struct random_mng *mng, unsigned int count)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int idx;
> > + const unsigned int last_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(master_lists) - 1;
> > +
> > + memset(mng, 0, sizeof(*mng));
> > + mng->count = count;
> > + mng->pos = 0;
> > + /* count is >= 2 */
> > + idx = ilog2(count) - 1;
> > + if (idx >= last_idx)
> > + idx = last_idx;
> > + else if (roundup_pow_of_two(idx + 1) != count)
> > + idx++;
> > + mng->master_list = master_lists[idx];
> > + if (mng->master_list.count == mng->count)
> > + mng->type = match;
> > + else if (mng->master_list.count > mng->count)
> > + mng->type = more;
> > + else
> > + mng->type = less;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static freelist_idx_t get_next_entry(struct random_mng *mng)
> > +{
> > + if (mng->type == less && mng->pos == mng->master_list.count) {
> > + mng->padding += mng->pos;
> > + mng->pos = 0;
> > + }
> > + BUG_ON(mng->pos >= mng->master_list.count);
> > + return mng->master_list.list[mng->pos++];
> > +}
> > +
> > +static freelist_idx_t next_random_slot(struct random_mng *mng)
> > +{
> > + freelist_idx_t cur, entry;
> > +
> > + entry = get_next_entry(mng);
> > +
> > + if (mng->type != match) {
> > + while ((entry + mng->padding) >= mng->count)
> > + entry = get_next_entry(mng);
> > + cur = entry + mng->padding;
> > + BUG_ON(cur >= mng->count);
> > + } else {
> > + cur = entry;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return cur;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page,
> > + unsigned int count)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int i;
> > + struct random_mng mng;
> > +
> > + if (count < 2) {
> > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
> > + set_free_obj(page, i, i);
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* Last chunk is used already in this case */
> > + if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep))
> > + count--;
> > +
> > + random_mng_initialize(&mng, count);
> > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
> > + set_free_obj(page, i, next_random_slot(&mng));
> > +
> > + if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep))
> > + set_free_obj(page, i, i);
> > +}
>
> Same thing here...
>
> #else
> static inline void set_free_obj(...) { }
> static inline void shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
> struct page *page, unsigned int count) { }
>
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */
> > +
> > static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
> > struct page *page)
> > {
> > @@ -2464,8 +2613,14 @@ static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
> > kasan_poison_object_data(cachep, objp);
> > }
> >
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM
> > set_free_obj(page, i, i);
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */
>
> For this one, I'd use:
>
> if (config_enabled(CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM))
> set_free_obj(page, i, i);
>
> > }
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM
> > + shuffle_freelist(cachep, page, cachep->num);
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */
>
> This one can drop the ifdef in favor of using the stub function too.
>
> > }
> >
> > static void kmem_flagcheck(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags)
> > --
> > 2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
> >
>
> Exciting!
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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