linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+vdc06J6CtVUUZyyC8PjP5DJFozOJOu43nLUwsagjyOg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 12 Apr 2016 09:57:45 -0700
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@....samsung.com>,
	Guenter Roeck <linux@...ck-us.net>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
	Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@...aro.org>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 2:59 AM, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Apr 2016, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> This provides the mini-LSM "loadpin" that intercepts the now consolidated
>> kernel_file_read LSM hook so that a system can keep all loads coming from
>> a single trusted filesystem. This is what Chrome OS uses to pin kernel
>> module and firmware loading to the read-only crypto-verified dm-verity
>> partition so that kernel module signing is not needed.
>>
>
> This all looks good to me, just waiting now for the const fix suggested by
> Joe.

Okay, great, thanks! I've sent a v4 with the const change now.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security