linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 01/13] devpts: Teach /dev/ptmx to find the associated devpts via path lookup

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Message-ID: <CALCETrUJ_KuGJoVxuUjWGCNHBNs5Vk8E68MtsWoTdURJ+=iJnQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 12 Apr 2016 10:44:50 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	security@...ian.org, "security@...nel.org" <security@...nel.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	"security@...ntu.com >> security" <security@...ntu.com>,
	Peter Hurley <peter@...leysoftware.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
	Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
	Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@...el32.net>,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/13] devpts: Teach /dev/ptmx to find the associated
 devpts via path lookup

On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 9, 2016 at 6:27 PM, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Apr 9, 2016 5:45 PM, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> What we *do* want to do, though, is to prevent the following:
>>
>> I don't see the point. Why do you bring up this insane scenario that nobody
>> can possibly care about?
>>
>> So you actually have any reason to believe somebody does that?
>>
>> I already asked about that earlier, and the silence was deafening.
>
> I have no idea, but I'm generally uncomfortable with magical things
> that bypass normal security policy.
>
> That being said, here's an idea for fixing this, at least in the long
> run.  Add a new devpts mount option "no_ptmx_redirect" that turns off
> this behavior for the super in question.  That is, opening /dev/ptmx
> if "pts/ptmx" points to something with no_ptmx_redirect set will fail.
> Distros shipping new kernels could be encouraged to (finally!) make
> /dev/ptmx a symlink and set this option.
>
> We just might be able to get away with spelling that option "newinstance".

Linus, you said that people who want to protect their pts should deny
execute.  So I set it up:

# ls -l
total 0
crw-------. 1 root root 5, 2 Apr 12 10:38 ptmx
drwx------. 2 root root    0 Apr  2 11:35 pts

$ unshare -urm
# ls -l
total 0
crw-------. 1 nfsnobody nfsnobody 5, 2 Apr 12 10:38 ptmx
drwx------. 2 nfsnobody nfsnobody    0 Apr  2 11:35 pts
# mount --bind /dev/ptmx ptmx
# ls -l
total 0
crw-rw-rw-. 1 nfsnobody nfsnobody 5, 2 Apr 12 10:42 ptmx
drwx------. 2 nfsnobody nfsnobody    0 Apr  2 11:35 pts

And there goes your protection.  So the whole /dev directory would
have to deny execute to protect against this.

But I think that gating this on mount options might be fine.  If
devpts is mounted with newinstance, then /dev/ptmx *already doesn't
work for it*, right?  So can we just say that the magic ptmx ->
pts/ptmx redirect doesn't work if the pts filesystem in question is
mounted with newinstance?

--Andy