linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 02/56] PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <1460494754-32183-3-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Date:	Tue, 12 Apr 2016 13:58:20 -0700
From:	Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc:	Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
	Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 02/56] PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argument

3.19.8-ckt19 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

---8<------------------------------------------------------------

From: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>

commit e54358915d0a00399c11c2c23ae1be674cba188a upstream.

Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the
*_trusted argument is never set to false.

pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering
a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.

This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for
example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust.

Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local
variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust():

  UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14
  load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
  [...]
  Call Trace:
    [<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
    [<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
    [<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e
    [<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158
    [<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf
    [<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370
    [<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370
    [<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50
    [<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0
    [<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170
    [<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b
    [<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0
    [<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290
    [...]

The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust
when it really shouldn't have.

Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning
of pkcs7_validate_trust().

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@...onical.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 1d29376..841a04c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 	int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
 	int ret;
 
+	*_trusted = false;
+
 	for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
 		p->seen = false;
 
-- 
2.7.4