linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.5 029/124] xen/events: Mask a moving irq

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Message-Id: <20160418022617.226039243@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Mon, 18 Apr 2016 11:28:21 +0900
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...rix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.5 029/124] xen/events: Mask a moving irq

4.5-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>

commit ff1e22e7a638a0782f54f81a6c9cb139aca2da35 upstream.

Moving an unmasked irq may result in irq handler being invoked on both
source and target CPUs.

With 2-level this can happen as follows:

On source CPU:
        evtchn_2l_handle_events() ->
            generic_handle_irq() ->
                handle_edge_irq() ->
                   eoi_pirq():
                       irq_move_irq(data);

                       /***** WE ARE HERE *****/

                       if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
                           clear_evtchn(evtchn);

If at this moment target processor is handling an unrelated event in
evtchn_2l_handle_events()'s loop it may pick up our event since target's
cpu_evtchn_mask claims that this event belongs to it *and* the event is
unmasked and still pending. At the same time, source CPU will continue
executing its own handle_edge_irq().

With FIFO interrupt the scenario is similar: irq_move_irq() may result
in a EVTCHNOP_unmask hypercall which, in turn, may make the event
pending on the target CPU.

We can avoid this situation by moving and clearing the event while
keeping event masked.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@...rix.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/xen/events/events_base.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -484,9 +484,19 @@ static void eoi_pirq(struct irq_data *da
 	struct physdev_eoi eoi = { .irq = pirq_from_irq(data->irq) };
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	irq_move_irq(data);
+	if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+		return;
 
-	if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+	if (unlikely(irqd_is_setaffinity_pending(data))) {
+		int masked = test_and_set_mask(evtchn);
+
+		clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+
+		irq_move_masked_irq(data);
+
+		if (!masked)
+			unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+	} else
 		clear_evtchn(evtchn);
 
 	if (pirq_needs_eoi(data->irq)) {
@@ -1357,9 +1367,19 @@ static void ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *
 {
 	int evtchn = evtchn_from_irq(data->irq);
 
-	irq_move_irq(data);
+	if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+		return;
 
-	if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+	if (unlikely(irqd_is_setaffinity_pending(data))) {
+		int masked = test_and_set_mask(evtchn);
+
+		clear_evtchn(evtchn);
+
+		irq_move_masked_irq(data);
+
+		if (!masked)
+			unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+	} else
 		clear_evtchn(evtchn);
 }