linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86

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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZHoP-B1VD9jkxH_Ma8sy+F9uYYQeormi47VeRSq3qhSOw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 21 Apr 2016 08:52:01 -0700
From:	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc:	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	Seth Jennings <sjennings@...iantweb.net>,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
	Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
	Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@...il.com>,
	Alexander Popov <alpopov@...ecurity.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
	Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
	Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64)

On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 8:46 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> On April 21, 2016 6:30:24 AM PDT, Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>On 04/15/2016 06:03 PM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
>>> +void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void)
>>> +{
>>> +    size_t i;
>>> +    unsigned long addr = memory_rand_start;
>>> +    unsigned long padding, rand, mem_tb;
>>> +    struct rnd_state rnd_st;
>>> +    unsigned long remain_padding = memory_rand_end - memory_rand_start;
>>> +
>>> +    if (!kaslr_enabled())
>>> +            return;
>>> +
>>> +    /* Take the additional space when Xen is not active. */
>>> +    if (!xen_domain())
>>> +            page_offset_base -= __XEN_SPACE;
>>
>>This should be !xen_pv_domain(). Xen HVM guests are no different from
>>bare metal as far as address ranges are concerned. (Technically it's
>>probably !xen_pv_domain() && !xen_pvh_domain() but we can ignore PVH
>>for
>>now since it is being replaced by an HVM-type guest)
>>
>>Having said that, I am not sure I understand why page_offset_base is
>>shifted. I thought 0xffff800000000000 - 0xffff87ffffffffff is not
>>supposed to be used by anyone, whether we are running under a
>>hypervisor
>>or not.
>>
>>-boris
>
> That range is reserved for the hypervisor use.

I know, I thought I could use it if no hypervisor was used but might
introduce problems in the future so I will remove it for the next
iteration.

> --
> Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse brevity and formatting.