linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.2 079/115] x86: standardize mmap

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Date:	Wed, 27 Apr 2016 01:02:24 +0200
From:	Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@...hat.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 079/115] x86: standardize mmap_rnd() usage

3.2.80-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

commit 82168140bc4cec7ec9bad39705518541149ff8b7 upstream.

In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this refactors the use of
mmap_rnd() to be used similarly to arm, and extracts the checking of
PF_RANDOMIZE.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -67,22 +67,21 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void)
 
 static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void)
 {
-	unsigned long rnd = 0;
+	unsigned long rnd;
 
 	/*
-	*  8 bits of randomness in 32bit mmaps, 20 address space bits
-	* 28 bits of randomness in 64bit mmaps, 40 address space bits
-	*/
-	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
-		if (mmap_is_ia32())
-			rnd = get_random_int() % (1<<8);
-		else
-			rnd = get_random_int() % (1<<28);
-	}
+	 *  8 bits of randomness in 32bit mmaps, 20 address space bits
+	 * 28 bits of randomness in 64bit mmaps, 40 address space bits
+	 */
+	if (mmap_is_ia32())
+		rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<8);
+	else
+		rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<28);
+
 	return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
 }
 
-static unsigned long mmap_base(void)
+static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
 {
 	unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
 
@@ -91,19 +90,19 @@ static unsigned long mmap_base(void)
 	else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
 		gap = MAX_GAP;
 
-	return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - mmap_rnd());
+	return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - rnd);
 }
 
 /*
  * Bottom-up (legacy) layout on X86_32 did not support randomization, X86_64
  * does, but not when emulating X86_32
  */
-static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(void)
+static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(unsigned long rnd)
 {
 	if (mmap_is_ia32())
 		return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
 	else
-		return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mmap_rnd();
+		return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + rnd;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -112,14 +111,19 @@ static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(vo
  */
 void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
-	mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base();
-	mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
+	unsigned long random_factor = 0UL;
+
+	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+		random_factor = mmap_rnd();
+
+	mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base(random_factor);
 
 	if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
 		mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
 	} else {
+		mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(random_factor);
 		mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
 		mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
 	}