linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20160427081804.GC16991@gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 27 Apr 2016 10:18:05 +0200
From:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
	"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
	Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions


* Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:

> > What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support?
> 
> This patchset or similar, plus some user code and an enclave to use.
> 
> Sadly, on current CPUs, you also need Intel to bless the enclave.  It looks like 
> new CPUs might relax that requirement.

That looks like a fundamental technical limitation in my book - to an open source 
user this is essentially a very similar capability as tboot: it only allows the 
execution of externally blessed static binary blobs...

I don't think we can merge any of this upstream until it's clear that the hardware 
owner running open-source user-space can also freely define/start his own secure 
enclaves without having to sign the enclave with any external party. I.e. 
self-signed enclaves should be fundamentally supported as well.

Thanks,

	Ingo