linux-kernel - [PATCH v0 3/3] perf, x86: Bypass PT vs LBR exclusivity if the core supports it

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Date:	Thu, 28 Apr 2016 18:35:46 +0300
From:	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
To:	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>
Cc:	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, vince@...ter.net, eranian@...gle.com,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>,
	Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@...aro.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v0 3/3] perf, x86: Bypass PT vs LBR exclusivity if the core supports it

Not all cores prevent using Intel PT and LBRs simultaneously, although
most of them still do as of today. This patch adds an opt-in flag for
such cores to disable mutual exclusivity between PT and LBR; also flip
it on for Goldmont.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/events/core.c       | 6 ++++++
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 1 +
 arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 1 +
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index 41d93d0e97..5e5e76a52f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ int x86_add_exclusive(unsigned int what)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (x86_pmu.lbr_pt_coexist)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&x86_pmu.lbr_exclusive[what])) {
 		mutex_lock(&pmc_reserve_mutex);
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x86_pmu.lbr_exclusive); i++) {
@@ -380,6 +383,9 @@ fail_unlock:
 
 void x86_del_exclusive(unsigned int what)
 {
+	if (x86_pmu.lbr_pt_coexist)
+		return;
+
 	atomic_dec(&x86_pmu.lbr_exclusive[what]);
 	atomic_dec(&active_events);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 79b59437f5..e36422c687 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -3609,6 +3609,7 @@ __init int intel_pmu_init(void)
 		 */
 		x86_pmu.pebs_aliases = NULL;
 		x86_pmu.pebs_prec_dist = true;
+		x86_pmu.lbr_pt_coexist = true;
 		x86_pmu.flags |= PMU_FL_HAS_RSP_1;
 		pr_cont("Goldmont events, ");
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
index 7d62a02f49..8bd764df81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
@@ -601,6 +601,7 @@ struct x86_pmu {
 	u64		lbr_sel_mask;		   /* LBR_SELECT valid bits */
 	const int	*lbr_sel_map;		   /* lbr_select mappings */
 	bool		lbr_double_abort;	   /* duplicated lbr aborts */
+	bool		lbr_pt_coexist;		   /* LBR may coexist with PT */
 
 	/*
 	 * Intel PT/LBR/BTS are exclusive
-- 
2.8.0.rc3