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Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 15:28:03 -0400
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: Peter Hurley <peter@...leysoftware.com>
Cc: linux-audit@...hat.com, pmoore@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, sgrubb@...hat.com, eparis@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V4] audit: add tty field to LOGIN event
On 16/04/27, Peter Hurley wrote:
> On 04/27/2016 06:31 PM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > On 16/04/22, Peter Hurley wrote:
> >> On 04/21/2016 11:14 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >>> The tty field was missing from AUDIT_LOGIN events.
> >>>
> >>> Refactor code to create a new function audit_get_tty(), using it to
> >>> replace the call in audit_log_task_info() and to add it to
> >>> audit_log_set_loginuid(). Lock and bump the kref to protect it, adding
> >>> audit_put_tty() alias to decrement it.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> >>> ---
> >>>
> >>> V4: Add missing prototype for audit_put_tty() when audit syscall is not
> >>> enabled (MIPS).
> >>>
> >>> V3: Introduce audit_put_tty() alias to decrement kref.
> >>>
> >>> V2: Use kref to protect tty signal struct while in use.
> >>>
> >>> ---
> >>>
> >>> include/linux/audit.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>> kernel/audit.c | 18 +++++-------------
> >>> kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++++--
> >>> 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> >>> index b40ed5d..32cdafb 100644
> >>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> >>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> >>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
> >>> #include <linux/sched.h>
> >>> #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> >>> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
> >>> +#include <linux/tty.h>
> >>>
> >>> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
> >>> #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1)
> >>> @@ -343,6 +344,23 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> return tsk->sessionid;
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> +static inline struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> +{
> >>> + struct tty_struct *tty = NULL;
> >>> + unsigned long flags;
> >>> +
> >>> + spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
> >>> + if (tsk->signal)
> >>> + tty = tty_kref_get(tsk->signal->tty);
> >>> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags);
> >>
> >>
> >> Not that I'm objecting because I get that you're just refactoring
> >> existing code, but I thought I'd point out some stuff.
> >>
> >> 1. There's no need to check if signal_struct is NULL (ie. tsk->signal)
> >> because if it is, this will blow up trying to dereference the
> >> sighand_struct (ie tsk->sighand).
> >
> > Ok. This logic goes back 10 years and one month less two days. (45d9bb0e)
> >
> >> 2. The existing usage is always tsk==current
> >
> > My understanding is that when it is called via:
> >
> > copy_process()
> > audit_free()
> > __audit_free()
> > audit_log_exit()
> > audit_log_task_info()
> >
> > then tsk != current.
>
> While it's true that tsk != current here, everything relevant to tty
> in task_struct is the same because the nascent task is not even half-done.
> So tsk->sighand == current->sighand, tsk->signal == current->signal etc.
I agree this is true except in the case of !CLONE_SIGHAND, if it fails
after copy_sighand() or copy_signal() then it would be null and would
get freed before audit_free() is called. By the time tty gets copied
from current in this case, it is past the point of failure in
copy_process().
> If you're uncomfortable with pass-through execution like that, then the
> simple solution is:
>
> struct tty_struct *tty = NULL;
>
> /* tsk != current when copy_process() failed */
> if (tsk == current)
> tty = get_current_tty();
>
> because tty_kref_put(tty) accepts NULL tty and (obviously) so does
> tty_name(tty).
Given the circumstances above, this appears reasonable to me at first
look.
> Peter Hurley
>
> > This appears to be the only case which appears to
> > force lugging around tsk. This is noted in that commit referenced
> > above.
> >
> >> 3. If the idea is to make this invulnerable to tsk being gone, then
> >> the usage is unsafe anyway.
> >>
> >>
> >> So ultimately (but not necessarily for this patch) I'd prefer that either
> >> a. audit use existing tty api instead of open-coding, or
> >> b. add any tty api functions required.
> >
> > This latter option did cross my mind...
> >
> >> Peter Hurley
> >>
> >>> + return tty;
> >>> +}
> >>> +
> >>> +static inline void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
> >>> +{
> >>> + tty_kref_put(tty);
> >>> +}
> >>> +
> >>> extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
> >>> extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode);
> >>> extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> >>> @@ -500,6 +518,12 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> {
> >>> return -1;
> >>> }
> >>> +static inline struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> +{
> >>> + return NULL;
> >>> +}
> >>> +static inline void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
> >>> +{ }
> >>> static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> >>> { }
> >>> static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid,
> >>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> >>> index 3a3e5de..7edd776 100644
> >>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> >>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> >>> @@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
> >>> #include <linux/security.h>
> >>> #endif
> >>> #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >>> -#include <linux/tty.h>
> >>> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
> >>> #include <net/netns/generic.h>
> >>>
> >>> @@ -1873,21 +1872,14 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> {
> >>> const struct cred *cred;
> >>> char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
> >>> - char *tty;
> >>> + struct tty_struct *tty;
> >>>
> >>> if (!ab)
> >>> return;
> >>>
> >>> /* tsk == current */
> >>> cred = current_cred();
> >>> -
> >>> - spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
> >>> - if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
> >>> - tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
> >>> - else
> >>> - tty = "(none)";
> >>> - spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
> >>> -
> >>> + tty = audit_get_tty(tsk);
> >>> audit_log_format(ab,
> >>> " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
> >>> " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
> >>> @@ -1903,11 +1895,11 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
> >>> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
> >>> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
> >>> from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
> >>> - tty, audit_get_sessionid(tsk));
> >>> -
> >>> + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> >>> + audit_get_sessionid(tsk));
> >>> + audit_put_tty(tty);
> >>> audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> >>> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, tsk));
> >>> -
> >>> audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, tsk->mm);
> >>> audit_log_task_context(ab);
> >>> }
> >>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >>> index 195ffae..71e14d8 100644
> >>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> >>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> >>> @@ -1980,6 +1980,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
> >>> {
> >>> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> >>> uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
> >>> + struct tty_struct *tty;
> >>>
> >>> if (!audit_enabled)
> >>> return;
> >>> @@ -1987,14 +1988,17 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
> >>> uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> >>> oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
> >>> loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
> >>> + tty = audit_get_tty(current);
> >>>
> >>> ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
> >>> if (!ab)
> >>> return;
> >>> audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
> >>> audit_log_task_context(ab);
> >>> - audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
> >>> - oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
> >>> + audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
> >>> + oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> >>> + oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
> >>> + audit_put_tty(tty);
> >>> audit_log_end(ab);
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> > - RGB
> >
> > --
> > Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> > Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
> > Remote, Ottawa, Canada
> > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
> >
>
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
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