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Message-ID: <20160429220806.GA3766@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2016 01:08:06 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 09:00:10PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Mon 2016-04-25 20:34:07, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by
> > applications to set aside private regions of code and data. The code
> > outside the enclave is disallowed to access the memory inside the
> > enclave by the CPU access control.
> >
> > The firmware uses PRMRR registers to reserve an area of physical memory
> > called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). There is a hardware unit in the
> > processor called Memory Encryption Engine. The MEE encrypts and decrypts
> > the EPC pages as they enter and leave the processor package.
>
> What are non-evil use cases for this?
Virtual TPMs for containers/guests would be one such use case.
/Jarkko
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