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Message-ID: <20160501094036.GC14243@amd>
Date: Sun, 1 May 2016 11:40:36 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
"open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@...verdev.osuosl.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@...ux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
Hi!
On Fri 2016-04-29 23:17:44, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 09:00:10PM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > On Mon 2016-04-25 20:34:07, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > The firmware uses PRMRR registers to reserve an area of physical memory
> > > called Enclave Page Cache (EPC). There is a hardware unit in the
> > > processor called Memory Encryption Engine. The MEE encrypts and decrypts
> > > the EPC pages as they enter and leave the processor package.
> >
> > What are non-evil use cases for this?
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by non-evil.
Well, that's kind of hard to explain.
> > What are non-evil use cases for this?
>
> Virtual TPMs for containers/guests would be one such use case.
..but as long as Intel has to sign each piece of software so that it
can use SGX, it is unsuitable for Linux kernel.
Best regards,
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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