linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.14 21/37] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

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Message-Id: <20160503000424.240125904@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:	Mon,  2 May 2016 17:12:10 -0700
From:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	stable@...r.kernel.org,
	Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@...il.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
	Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 21/37] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

3.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@...il.com>

commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.

Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@...il.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -785,6 +785,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device
 	if (!(size > 0))
 		return 0;

+	if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+		/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+		if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return -EPIPE;
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
 	if (ret != size) {
 		dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);